On 7/2/2013 10:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jul 2, 2013 at 11:45 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 7/2/2013 8:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
If we compare the percentage of possible programs that are supportive of
observers in relation to all programs of the same length, we can derive
like chaitin's constant.
You've jumped to measures on programs.
I was making the point that we may be able to prove that in the distribution of possible
structures, ones that lead to self organized information patterns with intelligence are
likely a small minority, not that it will give us the value of alpha, although this is
what Bruno hopes will one day be possible with sufficient computational power and thought.
In such a program there are presumably parameters that fix the value of the
constants. Now are you proposing that a program that sets alpha=1/137 is
probable" than one that sets the value to 1/136.5. Is it less probably
that sets alpha=1/130? Is the measure to be on alpha or 1/alpha?
I would say the probability should be weighted based on the minimum description
necessary to describe all the constants and physical laws. E.g., you might decide to
weight them by how frequently it (re)appears in the UD.
And you might decide to weight them so this universe has probability 1.0. Can you even
prove that a shorter program appears more often in the UD than every longer program (I'm
pretty sure it's not true)? And why should how often it appears be a "weight". If the
same program appears N times then it calculates the same thing N times. In Platonia there
is identity of indiscernables.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.