On 7/2/2013 10:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jul 2, 2013 at 11:45 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 7/2/2013 8:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
    If we compare the percentage of  possible programs that are supportive of 
conscious
    observers in relation to all programs of the same length, we can derive 
something
    like chaitin's constant.

    You've jumped to measures on programs.


I was making the point that we may be able to prove that in the distribution of possible structures, ones that lead to self organized information patterns with intelligence are likely a small minority, not that it will give us the value of alpha, although this is what Bruno hopes will one day be possible with sufficient computational power and thought.

    In such a program there are presumably parameters that fix the value of the 
physical
    constants.  Now are you proposing that a program that sets alpha=1/137 is 
"more
    probable" than one that sets the value to 1/136.5.  Is it less probably 
than one
    that sets alpha=1/130? Is the measure to be on alpha or 1/alpha?



I would say the probability should be weighted based on the minimum description necessary to describe all the constants and physical laws. E.g., you might decide to weight them by how frequently it (re)appears in the UD.

And you might decide to weight them so this universe has probability 1.0. Can you even prove that a shorter program appears more often in the UD than every longer program (I'm pretty sure it's not true)? And why should how often it appears be a "weight". If the same program appears N times then it calculates the same thing N times. In Platonia there is identity of indiscernables.

Brent

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