On Wed, Jul 3, 2013 at 1:16 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 7/2/2013 10:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Jul 2, 2013 at 11:45 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 7/2/2013 8:25 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> If we compare the percentage of possible programs that are supportive of >> conscious observers in relation to all programs of the same length, we can >> derive something like chaitin's constant. >> >> >> You've jumped to measures on programs. >> > > I was making the point that we may be able to prove that in the > distribution of possible structures, ones that lead to self organized > information patterns with intelligence are likely a small minority, not > that it will give us the value of alpha, although this is what Bruno hopes > will one day be possible with sufficient computational power and thought. > > >> In such a program there are presumably parameters that fix the value of >> the physical constants. Now are you proposing that a program that sets >> alpha=1/137 is "more probable" than one that sets the value to 1/136.5. Is >> it less probably than one that sets alpha=1/130? Is the measure to be >> on alpha or 1/alpha? >> > > > I would say the probability should be weighted based on the minimum > description necessary to describe all the constants and physical laws. > E.g., you might decide to weight them by how frequently it (re)appears in > the UD. > > > And you might decide to weight them so this universe has probability 1.0. > You could. This seems what those who ignore Wheeler's question are advocating. But it doesn't make any sense to me. How could mathematical possibility select just one of its infinite structures to cast favor upon? I see not only no justification for this idea, but no sensible motivation for it. > Can you even prove that a shorter program appears more often in the UD > than every longer program (I'm pretty sure it's not true)? And why should > how often it appears be a "weight". > I don't know what the correct weighting is or even how one could be proven, but if we take any random sampling of "universe-like structures", we could likely draw some conclusions about what fraction of them have the possible requirements and properties to lead to life. For example, Russel pointed out (maybe it was on the foar list) that expansion of the universe was required for information patterns to develop in our universe: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/layzer/ Similar heuristics might be discovered from a survey of other possible universe like structures. My hunch is that when all the requirements are taken together, the precise combination of all of them existing in the same structure will be uncommon. Jason If the same program appears N times then it calculates the same thing N > times. In Platonia there is identity of indiscernables. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.