On Friday, July 12, 2013 10:49:20 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: > > > > > I think functionalism (or more specifically, computationalism) is the > currently leading theory of mind among cognitive scientists and > philosophers. It is neither a materialistic, eliminativist, dualist, nor > idealist conception of mind. > >
Why isn't it dualist? You have the simulator (arithmetic truth, localized arbitrarily by spontaneous/inevitable Turing machine), and the simulated (an emergent non-arithmetic presence which appears magically within the simulation, for no reason). Why isn't it idealist? Can computation be separated from ideal principles? I think that most who subscribe to comp do so in an eliminativist way. Consciousness is seen as an epiphenomenon of unconscious computations. As for Relativity, I don't really know what it can mean other than a context of sensory awareness in which one phenomenon is felt, seen, or otherwise experienced as being 'related' in some way. Relativity is already perception, or it is nothing. Thanks, Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
