On Friday, July 12, 2013 10:49:20 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
> I think functionalism (or more specifically, computationalism) is the
> currently leading theory of mind among cognitive scientists and
> philosophers. It is neither a materialistic, eliminativist, dualist, nor
> idealist conception of mind.
Why isn't it dualist? You have the simulator (arithmetic truth, localized
arbitrarily by spontaneous/inevitable Turing machine), and the simulated
(an emergent non-arithmetic presence which appears magically within the
simulation, for no reason).
Why isn't it idealist? Can computation be separated from ideal principles?
I think that most who subscribe to comp do so in an eliminativist way.
Consciousness is seen as an epiphenomenon of unconscious computations.
As for Relativity, I don't really know what it can mean other than a
context of sensory awareness in which one phenomenon is felt, seen, or
otherwise experienced as being 'related' in some way. Relativity is already
perception, or it is nothing.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.