On Tuesday, July 16, 2013 11:29:07 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jul 15, 2013 at 11:54 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>> 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Friday, July 12, 2013 10:49:20 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> I think functionalism (or more specifically, computationalism) is the 
> >> currently leading theory of mind among cognitive scientists and 
> >> philosophers.  It is neither a materialistic, eliminativist, dualist, 
> nor 
> >> idealist conception of mind. 
> >> 
> > 
> > 
> > Why isn't it dualist? You have the simulator (arithmetic truth, 
> localized 
> > arbitrarily by spontaneous/inevitable Turing machine), and the simulated 
> (an 
> > emergent non-arithmetic presence which appears magically within the 
> > simulation, for no reason). 
> > 
> > Why isn't it idealist? Can computation be separated from ideal 
> principles? 
> > 
> > I think that most who subscribe to comp do so in an eliminativist way. 
> > Consciousness is seen as an epiphenomenon of unconscious computations. 
>
> Maybe you're right, but I think they are confusing comp with a form of 
> materialism where you just substitute equations for Turing machines. 
> Bruno's UDA seems to reduce this idea ad absurdum. 
>
> My personal and current bet is that everything is conscious to begin 
> with (i.e consciousness is the fundamental stuff). Comp -- or 
> Russell's theory of nothing -- are just ways to explain why I perceive 
> the sort of stuff I perceive. I don't think all this is terribly 
> incompatible with your views, actually. 
>

Yes, it sounds like we are on the same page about all that. I do think that 
they are confusing comp with a form of materialism. It's tricky. In my 
view, computation allows us to import and export sense through an automated 
medium by using only the lowest level motives. That is what all machines 
do, and that is how you make an inanimate object seem like it is doing what 
you want it to do (when in fact, it's only materials in the parts of the 
machines reacting as they always do to the conditions which we have set up 
- pulling strings, turning gears, heating up a transformer coil, etc. It 
would be like if some alien race found that when they played a certain tone 
on their extraterrestrial mind whistles, the activity in the cities changed 
to produce more noise and pesticides, which they like. Now the city is a 
machine, but the citizens there are only aware that it has become stylish 
to yell in public and people seem to be worrying about pests more than 
usual.

So yes, I agree, most people who kneel to the machina ex deus of comp do so 
as way of making materialism seem more modern. Information is hardened into 
pellets of a non-specific kind and the 19th century mindset of headless 
Deism is reborn.

Craig
 

>
> Telmo. 
>
> > As for Relativity, I don't really know what it can mean other than a 
> context 
> > of sensory awareness in which one phenomenon is felt, seen, or otherwise 
> > experienced as being 'related' in some way. Relativity is already 
> > perception, or it is nothing. 
> > 
> > Thanks, 
> > Craig 
> > 
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