On Saturday, July 20, 2013 12:19:31 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 20 Jul 2013, at 15:15, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, July 17, 2013 12:06:38 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 16 Jul 2013, at 17:29, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> > On Mon, Jul 15, 2013 at 11:54 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com >> > > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> On Friday, July 12, 2013 10:49:20 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> I think functionalism (or more specifically, computationalism) is >> >>> the >> >>> currently leading theory of mind among cognitive scientists and >> >>> philosophers. It is neither a materialistic, eliminativist, >> >>> dualist, nor >> >>> idealist conception of mind. >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> Why isn't it dualist? You have the simulator (arithmetic truth, >> >> localized >> >> arbitrarily by spontaneous/inevitable Turing machine), and the >> >> simulated (an >> >> emergent non-arithmetic presence which appears magically within the >> >> simulation, for no reason). >> >> >> >> Why isn't it idealist? Can computation be separated from ideal >> >> principles? >> >> >> >> I think that most who subscribe to comp do so in an eliminativist >> >> way. >> >> Consciousness is seen as an epiphenomenon of unconscious >> >> computations. >> > >> > Maybe you're right, but I think they are confusing comp with a form of >> > materialism where you just substitute equations for Turing machines. >> > Bruno's UDA seems to reduce this idea ad absurdum. >> > >> > My personal and current bet is that everything >> >> But what everything? > > > Everything, or everythingness is sense. It/we are perceptual participants > in a pansensitive Uni-verse, aka monad of non-orientable > self-juxtaposition, > > > ? > > > > > http://multisenserealism.com/2013/07/14/breaking-the-fourth-wall/ > > >> What does exist? > > > If we are talking about what exist in an absolute perspective, then only > sense exists. > > > It is your assumption, but it assumes what i estimate we have to explain. >
If you assume that sense can come from arithmetic truth, then you are doing exactly the same thing, only without acknowledging it, since the way that a Turing machine works depends on sense as much as anything. If Santa Clause gives you sense packaged in with your arithmetic truth, then you too are assuming what we have to explain, only you deny that you have already assumed it. > > > > > If we are talking about existence as far as what can be sensed locally to > each of us, that depends on the whole history of our local circumstance > going back to the 'beginning'/hub of time. If you are talking about > existence as far as realism, then you are talking about what exists > publicly, so that would be that which appears to be matter and the > mathematical/eternal/unintentional functions of matter (energy). > > >> Or what do you assume at the >> start. > > > I assume sense. > http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/msr_legend.jpg > > >> With comp 0 exists, and if x exists s(x) exists, and nothing >> more than that need to "exist" in the ontological sense. > > > First of all 0 and x don't exist now. > > > x was for something. The idea is that 0 exist, and thus s(0) exists, and > s(s(0)), etc. > > To say that 0 does not exist, but that sense exists does not appeal much > to me. > How can 0 exist without there being some context of sense in which 0 has properties, experiences, outcomes, relations... You have given 0 a full fledged super-human life of rich sensory-motor interactions, but then think that sense would have to be something else on top of that which requires 0 to exist. > > > > > They are concepts. I have never seen 0 and 0 has never seen me. > > > But to see something is not an argument for existence. > But it is an argument for its universality. I can see a gopher, and a gopher can see me, so that at least has a good chance of being something which exists in a public way. What is 0? A figure which can be used to verify certain expectations. Verification and expectation are already parts of sense. > > > > Secondly in order for those concepts, which I call Quanta to exist, you > already have to have a universe full of things to count in which the > sense-making clarity of counting is presented across multiple sense > channels. > > > In your non comp theory, which assumes far too much to my taste. > Your theory assumes everything that mine does, but it doesn't recognize that the machine which all Turing machines runs on requires many kinds of sense other than arithmetic truth. > > > > > Of course s(x) doesn't work for all senses. While Mathematics can be > thought of as quite a deep interior pursuit, it is ultimately the essence > of exterior experiences which are being interiorized, as I have tried to > point out many times. To count, we need rhythm and memory first. Beyond > that, we need to recruit our fingers and toes as our first mechanical > digits, and then beads, gears, semiconductors and ll the rest. > > > But it is easier to explain memory in term of number, than number in term > of (human?) memory. > I wouldn't do either one. My point is that we enlist the help of fingers, pencil and paper, calculators, etc because our memory is more of an aesthetic sponge and actor than it is a fixed keeper of records. Arithmetic is profoundly alien to us. Most people find it very difficult and unpleasant to learn beyond elementary levels. We aren't very good at counting and what is very good to count with is not very good at being like us. > > > > > > >> The laws of >> addition and mutiplication are enough to define the dreams, and >> consciousness and matter are dream appearance (plausibly "true" for >> consciousness", and "probable" for the physical expectations. >> >> That does not surprise me. If you begin with 'laws', then you begin with > consciousness already. > > > I don't think so, unless you are solipsist or something. > Not a solipsist. What do you suppose that laws are made of, where they come from? Just Santa Claus brings laws and somehow everything telepathically knows about them and obeys them? > > > You invent law to invent math to invent consciousness to justify law. > There is no law, no law giver, no law follower without sense, and with > sense there is no need for a law primitively. Everything feels what it is, > knows what to do enough to do it. Law is not imposed from the void, it > emerges from the coherence of common sense-motive interaction. > > > This might be interpreted in the comp theory, but not for the numbers, > which have to be assumed (or you need something turing equivalent). > No, I'm saying that what Turing relies on also requires sense. Without sense, 1 cannot be anything, let alone act as if it were part of 2. My understanding is that Sense is the only plausible candidate for the Absolute Fundamental. Again, if it were something else, like Arithmetic truth, then you would still need some reason why Arithmetic truth would need to develop sense. The way that I have modeled it, with qualia and quanta as aspects of sense has no down side at all as far as I can tell. > > > > > >> >> >> >> > is conscious to begin >> > with (i.e consciousness is the fundamental stuff). >> >> But consciousness is not a stuff, and ... well ... it might be as >> fundamental as arithmetical truth minus epsilon ... >> > > I try to avoid using 'stuff' but it creeps in sometimes. Fundamentality? > > > The question is what you assume, but I have stopped asking because you > keep being too much vague on this to me. > Why do you claim that I am being vague on it. I have made it very clear again and again. What I assume is self-nesting sensory-motor participation, aka sense . That's all that I have ever assumed, and nothing can be considered as a competing phenomenon which does not also rely on sense at its fundamental level. Arithmetic is a machine which runs on particular kinds of sensory-motor interactions. Those kinds of interactions found at the lowest levels of public phenomena, but not as much found within our private experience. No arithmetic knowledge can tell you how to speak or breathe. > > > >> >> >> > Comp -- or >> > Russell's theory of nothing -- are just ways to explain why I perceive >> > the sort of stuff I perceive. I don't think all this is terribly >> > incompatible with your views, actually. >> >> Craig *assumes* some physical reality, so it can't work with comp. >> > > I don't assume physical reality, I assume aesthetic experience, some of > which is public facing and some of tends to be more private facing. > > > Then derive something about the physical reality from the aesthetic > experience. > That is the entire history of human life. Everything that we have derived from nature is from our aesthetic experience of nature. Mathematics is a second order derivation - an analytical representation of those first order experiences. Physics does not use math and math does not use physics. Physics uses sense, and sense can be interrogated and controlled mathematically, but nature does not reveal any of the private experiential truths from this rather tactless interaction. It's like an American tourist finding that they can avoid learning local languages by pinching people and passing out money. Just because it works to some extent does not mean that the entire universe runs on pinchings and pennies. > Comp does exactly that, actually that, but with a notion of experience > related to the literature (knowledge theory), and without the "aesthetic", > which you diod not succeed in providing a satisfactory definition the last > time i asked. > It's not surprising that comp does that at all, since it is derived from the primitive vocabulary of common sense physical interactions rather than high level interiority. The definition of aesthetic is that which is conveyed through any kind of first hand sensory quality. A geometric figure requires a visual or tactile aesthetic. You can't hear or smell an octagon. You can't be dizzy in a square kind of way. Making leaps like that would require metaphorical appeals to yet another aesthetic medium which relates to both (the cognitive-verbal aesthetic). To get from raw arithmetic to an octagon or even a single line is an unresolvable problem. Arithmetic has no capacity to even know the difference between a triangle that is shaped like a triangle, and a set of coordinates which have the same relation that we recognize from triangle. This is the failure of comp. It is not a complex problem of Godelian wizardry or modal logic, it is the simple Emperor's New Clothes observation that math can't see or feel. It has no reason to ever generate something that can be seen or felt. This is quite clear to me, and it is clear to me also that you are either unaware, unwilling, or unable to accept the inarguable truth of this. This is the Achilles Heel of Comp, functionalism, mechanism, materialism, etc. There is simply no plausible reason to have sensed experience in the universe, and certainly no reason to have more than one sense modality. Thanks Craig > Bruno > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.