On Mon, Jul 15, 2013 at 11:54 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Friday, July 12, 2013 10:49:20 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I think functionalism (or more specifically, computationalism) is the
>> currently leading theory of mind among cognitive scientists and
>> philosophers.  It is neither a materialistic, eliminativist, dualist, nor
>> idealist conception of mind.
>>
>
>
> Why isn't it dualist? You have the simulator (arithmetic truth, localized
> arbitrarily by spontaneous/inevitable Turing machine), and the simulated (an
> emergent non-arithmetic presence which appears magically within the
> simulation, for no reason).
>
> Why isn't it idealist? Can computation be separated from ideal principles?
>
> I think that most who subscribe to comp do so in an eliminativist way.
> Consciousness is seen as an epiphenomenon of unconscious computations.

Maybe you're right, but I think they are confusing comp with a form of
materialism where you just substitute equations for Turing machines.
Bruno's UDA seems to reduce this idea ad absurdum.

My personal and current bet is that everything is conscious to begin
with (i.e consciousness is the fundamental stuff). Comp -- or
Russell's theory of nothing -- are just ways to explain why I perceive
the sort of stuff I perceive. I don't think all this is terribly
incompatible with your views, actually.

Telmo.

> As for Relativity, I don't really know what it can mean other than a context
> of sensory awareness in which one phenomenon is felt, seen, or otherwise
> experienced as being 'related' in some way. Relativity is already
> perception, or it is nothing.
>
> Thanks,
> Craig
>
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