On 18 Jul 2013, at 11:08, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Wed, Jul 17, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 16 Jul 2013, at 17:29, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, Jul 15, 2013 at 11:54 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com >
wrote:



On Friday, July 12, 2013 10:49:20 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:





I think functionalism (or more specifically, computationalism) is the
currently leading theory of mind among cognitive scientists and
philosophers. It is neither a materialistic, eliminativist, dualist,
nor
idealist conception of mind.



Why isn't it dualist? You have the simulator (arithmetic truth, localized arbitrarily by spontaneous/inevitable Turing machine), and the simulated
(an
emergent non-arithmetic presence which appears magically within the
simulation, for no reason).

Why isn't it idealist? Can computation be separated from ideal
principles?

I think that most who subscribe to comp do so in an eliminativist way. Consciousness is seen as an epiphenomenon of unconscious computations.


Maybe you're right, but I think they are confusing comp with a form of
materialism where you just substitute equations for Turing machines.
Bruno's UDA seems to reduce this idea ad absurdum.

My personal and current bet is that everything


But what everything? What does exist? Or what do you assume at the start. With comp 0 exists, and if x exists s(x) exists, and nothing more than that
need to "exist" in the ontological sense. The laws of addition and
mutiplication are enough to define the dreams, and consciousness and matter are dream appearance (plausibly "true" for consciousness", and "probable"
for the physical expectations.

But here I feel you're avoiding the question. If you're saying that
consciousness does not exist in the ontological sense, then you have
to explain why it feels like it does. It appears to be the same sort
of dead end that one gets at when one claims that consciousness
emerges from neural networks.

The theory assumes only the natural numbers and the laws of addition and multiplication.

Take the example of the prime numbers. being prime does not exist ontologically, in the sense that we don't have to assume them. We can derive their existence from the theory, without assuming them. And that makes them existing, even if not primitively.

It is the same with consciousness. Consciousness is a non primitive mathematical phenomena: the automated inference of one undoubtable truth by any universal numbers relatively to the universal numbers which sustain the computations in which that automated inference is stable enough. Or something like that. Like being prime is a real existing, but not primitive (assumed), property shared by many numbers, consciousness is a real, but not primitive (not assumed) property that, with comp, we have to attribute to person involved in the genuine computations, which are also an emergent concept.

The dead end with the claim that consciousness emerges from neural network is only due to the fact that with comp, it cannot work and the contrary is correct: neural networks emerges from deep computations and consciousness, in the way that I explain.








is conscious to begin
with (i.e consciousness is the fundamental stuff).


But consciousness is not a stuff, and ... well ... it might be as
fundamental as arithmetical truth minus epsilon ...

Ok, I didn't mean stuff as in matter. I just meant "consciousness is"
and nothing more.

Consciousness is. OK. But with comp we can explain 99,9% of it from addition and multiplication, and we can explain completely why necessarily a tiny part of it has to remain incomprehensible by *any* machine (nor even any entity, even god(s)).

We have just to agree on some basic facts on consciousness, and verify that machines get the notion in arithmetic. Then we can even understand the big role consciousness play in the unfolding of the arithmetical truth through the relatively self observing numbers.

The usual semi-axiom for consciousness is that it involves the belief in at least one thing/reality, the inability to define it, the inability to justify it rationally, that without it things like pain and pleasure don't exist, etc.



Aren't you contradicting yourself here? How can
consciousness be fundamental but not exist in the ontological sense?

Because like stars, planet, atoms, but also taxes, death, hell and heaven it exists epistemologically, again like the prime numbers, or anything emerging from the way the numbers can structure the additive- multiplicative reality.

Using consciousness (and/or matter) as primitives (assumed, ontological), prevents us to understand it (them).

It *is* a bit tricky, no doubt, because comp assumes consciousness (indeed it assumes consciousness and its invariance for a digital transformation). But then the UDA shows where both matter and consciousness comes from, and in the arithmetical translation of the UD Argument, you don't need to assume that consciousness is ontologically fundamental. They remain quite epistemologically fundamental.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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