On 20 Jul 2013, at 15:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, July 17, 2013 12:06:38 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Jul 2013, at 17:29, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> On Mon, Jul 15, 2013 at 11:54 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com
> > wrote:
>> On Friday, July 12, 2013 10:49:20 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>>> I think functionalism (or more specifically, computationalism) is
>>> the
>>> currently leading theory of mind among cognitive scientists and
>>> philosophers.  It is neither a materialistic, eliminativist,
>>> dualist, nor
>>> idealist conception of mind.
>> Why isn't it dualist? You have the simulator (arithmetic truth,
>> localized
>> arbitrarily by spontaneous/inevitable Turing machine), and the
>> simulated (an
>> emergent non-arithmetic presence which appears magically within the
>> simulation, for no reason).
>> Why isn't it idealist? Can computation be separated from ideal
>> principles?
>> I think that most who subscribe to comp do so in an eliminativist
>> way.
>> Consciousness is seen as an epiphenomenon of unconscious
>> computations.
> Maybe you're right, but I think they are confusing comp with a form of
> materialism where you just substitute equations for Turing machines.
> Bruno's UDA seems to reduce this idea ad absurdum.
> My personal and current bet is that everything

But what everything?

Everything, or everythingness is sense. It/we are perceptual participants in a pansensitive Uni-verse, aka monad of non- orientable self-juxtaposition,



What does exist?

If we are talking about what exist in an absolute perspective, then only sense exists.

It is your assumption, but it assumes what i estimate we have to explain.

If we are talking about existence as far as what can be sensed locally to each of us, that depends on the whole history of our local circumstance going back to the 'beginning'/hub of time. If you are talking about existence as far as realism, then you are talking about what exists publicly, so that would be that which appears to be matter and the mathematical/eternal/unintentional functions of matter (energy).

Or what do you assume at the

I assume sense. 

With comp 0 exists, and if x exists s(x) exists, and nothing
more than that need to "exist" in the ontological sense.

First of all 0 and x don't exist now.

x was for something. The idea is that 0 exist, and thus s(0) exists, and s(s(0)), etc.

To say that 0 does not exist, but that sense exists does not appeal much to me.

They are concepts. I have never seen 0 and 0 has never seen me.

But to see something is not an argument for existence.

Secondly in order for those concepts, which I call Quanta to exist, you already have to have a universe full of things to count in which the sense-making clarity of counting is presented across multiple sense channels.

In your non comp theory, which assumes far too much to my taste.

Of course s(x) doesn't work for all senses. While Mathematics can be thought of as quite a deep interior pursuit, it is ultimately the essence of exterior experiences which are being interiorized, as I have tried to point out many times. To count, we need rhythm and memory first. Beyond that, we need to recruit our fingers and toes as our first mechanical digits, and then beads, gears, semiconductors and ll the rest.

But it is easier to explain memory in term of number, than number in term of (human?) memory.

The laws of
addition and mutiplication are enough to define the dreams, and
consciousness and matter are dream appearance (plausibly "true" for
consciousness", and "probable" for the physical expectations.

That does not surprise me. If you begin with 'laws', then you begin with consciousness already.

I don't think so, unless you are solipsist or something.

You invent law to invent math to invent consciousness to justify law. There is no law, no law giver, no law follower without sense, and with sense there is no need for a law primitively. Everything feels what it is, knows what to do enough to do it. Law is not imposed from the void, it emerges from the coherence of common sense- motive interaction.

This might be interpreted in the comp theory, but not for the numbers, which have to be assumed (or you need something turing equivalent).

> is conscious to begin
> with (i.e consciousness is the fundamental stuff).

But consciousness is not a stuff, and ... well ... it might be as
fundamental as arithmetical truth minus epsilon ...

I try to avoid using 'stuff' but it creeps in sometimes. Fundamentality?

The question is what you assume, but I have stopped asking because you keep being too much vague on this to me.

> Comp -- or
> Russell's theory of nothing -- are just ways to explain why I perceive
> the sort of stuff I perceive. I don't think all this is terribly
> incompatible with your views, actually.

Craig *assumes* some physical reality, so it can't work with comp.

I don't assume physical reality, I assume aesthetic experience, some of which is public facing and some of tends to be more private facing.

Then derive something about the physical reality from the aesthetic experience. Comp does exactly that, actually that, but with a notion of experience related to the literature (knowledge theory), and without the "aesthetic", which you diod not succeed in providing a satisfactory definition the last time i asked.



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