On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 17 Sep 2013, at 19:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, September 17, 2013 6:07:23 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 7:47 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Saturday, September 14, 2013 5:53:01 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> >> >> wrote: >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> > Which reasoning is clearly false? >> >> >> > >> >> >> > Here's what I'm thinking: >> >> >> > >> >> >> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I >> am >> >> >> > not >> >> >> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised >> >> >> > about. >> >> >> > By >> >> >> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include >> >> >> > being >> >> >> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft >> >> >> > contingencies >> >> >> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. >> >> >> >> >> >> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no >> >> >> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been >> sure >> >> >> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the >> door >> >> >> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe >> the >> >> >> paradox still holds. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If >> I >> >> > say >> >> > 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise >> when', >> >> > that >> >> > is already a contradiction. >> >> >> >> Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this. >> >> The judge lied. You convinced me! :) >> > >> > >> > Ah cool! Thanks for posting the problem also, it helped me resurrect >> some >> > lost mathematical-logical ability. >> > >> >> >> >> (with due credit to Alberto and >> >> Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be >> >> "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise >> >> when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if >> >> you do". >> >> >> >> My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5 >> >> turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns >> >> to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to >> >> predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the >> >> defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker >> >> wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that >> >> the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker (judge) >> >> is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there >> >> is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple >> >> instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the >> >> attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will >> >> offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one >> >> can do. >> >> >> >> I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better. >> > >> > >> > Nice. >> > >> >> >> >> I >> >> am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily >> >> attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are >> >> equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as >> >> Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability? >> > >> > >> > Falsifiability is nice - especially in public-facing physics, but since >> > falsification itself is a sensory experience, we should not insist on >> the >> > same kind of falsifiability for private physics that we have in public >> > physics. >> >> Alright. Personal or 1p experiences are probably outside the realm of >> phenomena that can be investigated under Popperian science. I think >> this is something that many of us can agree with, independently of >> accepting/rejecting comp, for example. I think this is also what >> characterises hard-core positivists: they either find 1p reality >> irrelevant or even reject its existence. >> >> > Which makes sense, since from that kind of fundamentalist 3p perspective, > we can only take consciousness for granted. From there, we can either admit > or deny that we are taking it for granted, and if we admit it, then we > would want to minimize the significance of that. > > >> >> >> If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're >> >> proposing? >> > >> > >> > There may not be a test, so much as accumulating a body of >> understanding by >> > correlating uses of information and qualities of sensation. It's more >> at the >> > hypothesis stage than the testing stage. >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it. >> >> It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the >> >> answer will actually look something like an Escher painting. Assuming >> >> that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of neural >> >> firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to neural >> >> firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the >> >> symbols. Why not? >> > >> > >> > Still there's the hard problem. Why would neural firing patterns have a >> > smell? >> >> I don't know! But I think the mystery is not so much how symbols >> appear or why they appear. Computers can do that. > > > Computers don't use symbols. > > > ? > > > They use physics, > > > ??? > > You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts. >
If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What symbols does it use? > > > > > and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic universality > which can be exploited. Computers don't care about symbols though, or > output formats. > > > > Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but brain > and computer (body) are not person, but person's local vehicle. > We're on the same page there, but why call it computationalism and focus on logic, when it is personalism and focus on participatory aesthetics? > > > > >> The big mystery is >> how they become qualia. > > > That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer. In my > understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling or 'accounting' > of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished feelings. > > > OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That becomes > circular, it seems to me. > Fair enough. People (really experiences, I don't assume all experiences are self-ish experiences) use physics to compute. > > > > >> Which leads me to a point where I can >> definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private >> experiences have at least the same reality status as public >> experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you throw >> too much of the baby away with the (public) bath water. >> > > I don't think there are any experiences which are public and not private. > There are experiences, and there are private experiences in which other > private experiences are re-presented as public form-functions. > > > OK, > Cool Craig PS Curious if my posts on non-well-founded identity made any sense to you...there's a new one: http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/18/pink-floyd-money/ http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/16/non-well-founded-identity-principle/ > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
