On Saturday, September 14, 2013 5:53:01 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>> 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> 
> >> wrote: 
> >> > Which reasoning is clearly false? 
> >> > 
> >> > Here's what I'm thinking: 
> >> > 
> >> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday if I am 
> not 
> >> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be surprised 
> about. 
> >> > By 
> >> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could include 
> being 
> >> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft 
> contingencies 
> >> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome. 
> >> 
> >> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there are no 
> >> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having been sure 
> >> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at the door 
> >> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I believe the 
> >> paradox still holds. 
> > 
> > 
> > I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just contradiction. If I 
> say 
> > 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise when', 
> that 
> > is already a contradiction. 
>
> Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this. 
> The judge lied. You convinced me! :)


Ah cool! Thanks for posting the problem also, it helped me resurrect some 
lost mathematical-logical ability.
 

> (with due credit to Alberto and 
> Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement would be 
> "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise 
> when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a surprise if 
> you do". 
>
> My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There are 5 
> turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those turns 
> to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal is to 
> predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the 
> defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the attacker 
> wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that 
> the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker (judge) 
> is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot, there 
> is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple 
> instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the 
> attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will 
> offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing better one 
> can do. 
>
> I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better.


Nice.
 

> I 
> am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily 
> attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are 
> equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as 
> Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about falsifiability? 
>

Falsifiability is nice - especially in public-facing physics, but since 
falsification itself is a sensory experience, we should not insist on the 
same kind of falsifiability for private physics that we have in public 
physics. 
 

> If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're 
> proposing? 
>

There may not be a test, so much as accumulating a body of understanding by 
correlating uses of information and qualities of sensation. It's more at 
the hypothesis stage than the testing stage.
 

>
> The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it. 
> It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the 
> answer will actually look something like an Escher painting. Assuming 
> that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of neural 
> firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to neural 
> firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the 
> symbols. Why not? 
>

Still there's the hard problem. Why would neural firing patterns have a 
smell?

Thanks,
Craig
 

>
> Cheers, 
> Telmo. 
>
> > Adding the conceit of precise times doesn't 
> > alter the fundamental contradiction that you can be surprised when 
> someone's 
> > true prediction comes true. The week already includes every hour of 
> every 
> > day of the week, so it can't be a surprise on that level, but if the 
> judge 
> > doesn't specify a single time then it also has to be a surprise on 
> another 
> > level. You just have to pick on which level you are talking about, or 
> decide 
> > that one level automatically takes precedence over the other. 
> > 
> >> 
> >> > The condition of expectation 
> >> > isn't an objective phenomenon, it is a subjective inference. 
> >> > Objectively, 
> >> > there is no surprise as objects don't anticipate anything. 
> >> 
> >> I would say that surprise in this context can be defined formally and 
> >> objectively. The moment someone knocks at the door, the prisoner must 
> >> have assigned a probability < 1 that he would be executed that day. 
> >> This is clearly not the case for Friday, where p=1. 
> > 
> > 
> > Even on Friday it can still be a surprise, a meta-surprise, when he 
> finds 
> > out the judge lied, or knocks on the door an hour later. If we say that 
> > can't happen though, p=1 is still limited to Friday only if it's 
> Thursday. 
> > It doesn't accumulate. On Wednesday it's still 50-50 for Thursday and 
> Friday 
> > each. On Tuesday it's .33 for Wednesday-Friday each, so on Wednesday, 
> when 
> > the knock comes, he is 66% surprised - unless there's something I'm 
> missing. 
> > 
> >> 
> >> If we assume a 
> >> rational prisoner, we can replace it with an object. Some computer 
> >> running an algorithm. Here we can define the computer belief as some 
> >> output it produces somehow. We can even make this problem fully 
> >> abstract and get rid of the colourful story with hangings and judges. 
> > 
> > 
> > That's a problem if you fall for the Pathetic Fallacy and assume that 
> > computer 'beliefs' are literal rather than figures of speech. I posted 
> more 
> > about this here: 
> > 
> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/12/why-computers-cant-lie-and-dont-know-your-name/
>  
> >> 
> >> 
> >> > 2) If we want to close in tightly on the quantitative logic of 
> whether 
> >> > deducibility can be deduced - given five coin flips and a certainty 
> that 
> >> > one 
> >> > will be heads, each successive tails coin flip increases the odds 
> that 
> >> > one 
> >> > the remaining flips will be heads. The fifth coin will either be 100% 
> >> > likely 
> >> > to be heads, or will prove that the certainty assumed was 100% wrong. 
> >> 
> >> Coin flips are independent events. Knock/no-knock events are not 
> >> independent. Each day that passes without a knock increases the 
> >> probability of a knock the next day. 
> > 
> > 
> > Ok, but his surprise is not independent either. In a Wednesday knock, 
> that 
> > means he is 33% unsurprised. From the outset he can only be 20% 
> unsurprised 
> > at the minimum just by virtue of his knowing it has to be 1 out of 5 
> > days...including Friday, because Friday is only p=1 on Thursday after 
> noon. 
> > On on level, the knocks are independent events also - they either happen 
> or 
> > they don't - so probability breaks down at any moment of incidence. The 
> > probability is a subjective expectation, it cannot be relied on as an 
> > object. Probability is an abstraction layer that is a posteriori to 
> events. 
> > Spacetime is a museum of causally closed tokens which can represent and 
> > embody subjective experience, not the other way around. 
> > 
> >> 
> >> > I think the paradox hinges on 1) the false inference of objectivity 
> in 
> >> > the 
> >> > use of the word surprise 
> >> 
> >> Ok, let's replace the judge and the prisoner. A computer sits in a 
> >> room for 5 days. One of those days, at noon, an input will be fed to 
> >> the computer. If the computer fires an output at the exact same time 
> >> that the input is received, it wins. The computer is only allowed to 
> >> fire its response once. It's now a game between the programmer of the 
> >> computer and the programmer of the system that emits the signal to the 
> >> computer. How would you program these systems? It's clear that, if you 
> >> are programming the computer, you will mostly certainly add a rule to 
> >> fire the response if it's Friday. And then... 
> > 
> > 
> > I don't see the problem. All the computer can to is computer a 20% 
> > probability on Monday of all five days, and pseudorandomly pick one. 
> Every 
> > day that both programmer and computer do not pull the trigger, the odds 
> go 
> > up when it guesses again. It's the part about 'the judge/programmer was 
> > right' that is arbitrary and omniscient. How can the programmer tell the 
> > computer is not going to pick Friday until Thursday night? 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> > and 2) the false assertion of omniscience by the 
> >> > judge. It's like an Escher drawing. In real life, surprise cannot be 
> >> > predicted with certainty and the quality of unexpectedness it is not 
> an 
> >> > objective thing, just as expectation is not an objective thing. 
> >> > 
> >> > Or not? 
> >> 
> >> I am open to the possibility that this is a language trick, but not 
> >> yet convinced. 
> > 
> > 
> > See what you think of that post. These kinds of paradoxes don't really 
> come 
> > naturally to me, but I do feel very clear about the underlying nature of 
> > symbol grounding and how it related generally. Think of an Escher 
> drawing - 
> > its the same thing - the paradox is only a paradox if you read a symbol 
> as a 
> > literal reality. No symbol has any objective reality outside of some 
> > experience which interprets that way. 
> > 
> > Craig 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Telmo. 
> >> 
> >> > Craig 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > On Thursday, September 12, 2013 5:33:24 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes 
> wrote: 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Time for some philosophy then :) 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep: 
> >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Probably many of you already know about it. 
> >> >> 
> >> >> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this 
> >> >> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's 
> >> >> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is 
> >> >> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning 
> that 
> >> >> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct? 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Cheers, 
> >> >> Telmo. 
> >> > 
> >> > -- 
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