On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Computers don't use symbols.


They use physics,


You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts.

If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What symbols does it use?

it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols, for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage.

and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic universality which can be exploited. Computers don't care about symbols though, or output formats.

Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but brain and computer (body) are not person, but person's local vehicle.

We're on the same page there, but why call it computationalism and focus on logic, when it is personalism and focus on participatory aesthetics?

Because those things have to be related if we proceed in the comp theory.

The big mystery is
how they become qualia.

That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer. In my understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling or 'accounting' of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished feelings.

OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That becomes circular, it seems to me.

Fair enough. People (really experiences, I don't assume all experiences are self-ish experiences) use physics to compute.

OK. (for the human people).

Which leads me to a point where I can
definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private
experiences have at least the same reality status as public
experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you throw
too much of the baby away with the (public) bath water.

I don't think there are any experiences which are public and not private. There are experiences, and there are private experiences in which other private experiences are re-presented as public form- functions.




PS Curious if my posts on non-well-founded identity made any sense to you...there's a new one:



As I explained sometimes ago to Stephen King, non-well-foundness appears naturally, in many places in computer science, and so is very interesting, but it does not need to be postulated.
Your posts on your blog are not really intelligible to me. Sorry.



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