On 19 Sep 2013, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:43:23 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Computers don't use symbols.
>
> ?
>
>
>> They use physics,
>
> ???
>
> You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts.
>
> If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What
> symbols does it use?
it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols,
for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage.
The program can't see painted numbers though. How can it use them?
Well, actually those numbers are for a human debugger, as the program
use only the gears, like a mechanical clock. But if it needs to use
such symbols, he will use third person sensors, which are just some
measuring apparatus. Then he will not see, but the seeing will be made
by the person (if there is one) enacted by that program.
>
>
>
>
>
>> and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic
>> universality which can be exploited. Computers don't care about
>> symbols though, or output formats.
>
>
> Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but
> brain and computer (body) are not person, but person's local
vehicle.
>
> We're on the same page there, but why call it computationalism and
> focus on logic, when it is personalism and focus on participatory
> aesthetics?
Because those things have to be related if we proceed in the comp
theory.
I agree they are related, but the relation is person = fundamental
experience, computer = derived non-experience.
Indeed.
I'm open to it being the reverse,
I am afraid you are. That's the Aristotelian delusion (in case comp is
true).
but if the only reason to suspect that it is the reverse is because
we want to call it comp theory rather than person theory (or sense
theory :) ) then that doesn't seem like a very scientific reason.
The comp theory is just arithmetic, + the idea that we are
digitalizable machine. Its main advantage is that it gives a clear
account where the belief in the physical laws come from, and why it is
stable, or could be stable, making comp hard to refute. It explains
retrospectively the many-worlds, some formal aspect of the quantum,
and it gives the complete theory, which means that it is only a matter
of work to get the unitary groups, the particles and fields, etc. The
precise equations are there, but hard to solve, and not very well
knows, as they need some mathematical logic baggage.
>
>
>
>>
>> The big mystery is
>> how they become qualia.
>>
>> That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer.
>> In my understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling
>> or 'accounting' of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished
>> feelings.
>
> OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That
> becomes circular, it seems to me.
>
> Fair enough. People (really experiences, I don't assume all
> experiences are self-ish experiences) use physics to compute.
OK. (for the human people).
Why would non-human people be different?
OK, you are right. I wrote to quickly. If comp is correct the physics
is the same for all conscious entities. (But salvia keeps
contradicting me on this issue and I don't know what to think about
that!).
>
>
>
>
>>
>> Which leads me to a point where I can
>> definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private
>> experiences have at least the same reality status as public
>> experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you
throw
>> too much of the baby away with the (public) bath water.
>>
>> I don't think there are any experiences which are public and not
>> private. There are experiences, and there are private experiences
>> in which other private experiences are re-presented as public form-
>> functions.
>
> OK,
>
> Cool
>
> Craig
>
> PS Curious if my posts on non-well-founded identity made any sense
> to you...there's a new one:
>
> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/18/pink-floyd-money/
>
> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/16/non-well-founded-identity-principle/
As I explained sometimes ago to Stephen King, non-well-foundness
appears naturally, in many places in computer science, and so is very
interesting, but it does not need to be postulated.
Your posts on your blog are not really intelligible to me. Sorry.
Postulating it is really only a disclaimer - that what this refers
to is intentionally using a set which includes itself. The real
substance of what I'm postulating is in the nested relation, where
all x is not only simply x, but also it is a continuum of becoming x
by its negative universality.
You should try to explain this like I was a nine years old.
Each aspect of x is defined by the difference between every other
identity (not x) and what they cause x to become in their local
frame of reference.
?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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