On Friday, September 20, 2013 10:14:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 19 Sep 2013, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:43:23 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
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>> > 
>> > On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal   
>> > wrote: 
>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> Computers don't use symbols. 
>> > 
>> > ? 
>> > 
>> > 
>> >> They use physics, 
>> > 
>> > ??? 
>> > 
>> > You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts. 
>> > 
>> > If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What   
>> > symbols does it use? 
>>
>> it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols,   
>> for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage. 
>>
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> The program can't see painted numbers though. How can it use them?
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> Well, actually those numbers are for a human debugger, as the program use 
> only the gears, like a mechanical clock.
>

That's my point :)  Computers don't use symbols, symbols are for human 
debuggers.
 

> But if it needs to use such symbols, he will use third person sensors, 
> which are just some measuring apparatus. 
>

Haha.. you have just reduced God to 'some measuring apparatus', and made 
the janitor king of the universe. 

Why would a computer ever need to use sensors? It is quite happy to run in 
a loop for a thousand years. It is we, the human debuggers, who might want 
to attach devices to extend the machine's engagement with *our* human 
aesthetic world. The computer doesn't care about sense, because it's 
unconscious. It is perpetually under anesthetic. 

 

> Then he will not see, but the seeing will be made by the person (if there 
> is one) enacted by that program.
>

That's an assumption that there is such a thing as computationally enacted 
person. If a program can function without such a person, or proto person, 
then why should it choose to enact one? Who is doing the enacting of a 
person if not a digital person?
 

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>> >> and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic   
>> >> universality which can be exploited. Computers don't care about   
>> >> symbols though, or output formats. 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but   
>> > brain and computer (body) are not person, but person's local vehicle. 
>> > 
>> > We're on the same page there, but why call it computationalism and   
>> > focus on logic, when it is personalism and focus on participatory   
>> > aesthetics? 
>>
>> Because those things have to be related if we proceed in the comp   
>> theory. 
>>
>>
> I agree they are related, but the relation is person = fundamental 
> experience, computer = derived non-experience.
>
>
> Indeed. 
>

So we agree that aesthetic personhood is more fundamental than computation, 
yet you say that persons are enacted by programs? That's a contradiction, 
right?
 

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> I'm open to it being the reverse, 
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> I am afraid you are. That's the Aristotelian delusion (in case comp is 
> true).
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No, I mean I'm open to counter-arguments...I'm not saying that nobody can 
disagree with me.
 

>
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> but if the only reason to suspect that it is the reverse is because we 
> want to call it comp theory rather than person theory (or sense theory :) ) 
> then that doesn't seem like a very scientific reason.
>
>
> The comp theory is just arithmetic, + the idea that we are digitalizable 
> machine. Its main advantage is that it gives a clear account where the 
> belief in the physical laws come from, and why it is stable, or could be 
> stable, making comp hard to refute. It explains retrospectively the 
> many-worlds, some formal aspect of the quantum, and it gives the complete 
> theory, which means that it is only a matter of work to get the unitary 
> groups, the particles and fields, etc. The precise equations are there, but 
> hard to solve, and not very well knows, as they need some mathematical 
> logic baggage.
>

Ohh. I'm ok with comp being responsible for the belief in physical laws. 
That's what I get too. Qualia is derived from sense by means of quanta.  In 
a very real way, quanta is the 'thickening agent' which turns the 
primordial stew into thermodynamically irreversible experiences. You're 
talking about the event horizon where 1p meets 3p, but I'm talking about 
the totality of sense - the origin of the discernment of 1p and 3p in the 
first place.


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>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> The big mystery is 
>> >> how they become qualia. 
>> >> 
>> >> That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer.   
>> >> In my understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling   
>> >> or 'accounting' of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished   
>> >> feelings. 
>> > 
>> > OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That   
>> > becomes circular, it seems to me. 
>> > 
>> > Fair enough. People (really experiences, I don't assume all   
>> > experiences are self-ish experiences) use physics to compute. 
>>
>> OK. (for the human people). 
>>
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> Why would non-human people be different?
>
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> OK, you are right. I wrote to quickly. If comp is correct the physics is 
> the same for all conscious entities. (But salvia keeps contradicting me on 
> this issue and I don't know what to think about that!).
>

Heheh. I liked Nitrous Oxide, myself. Never tried saliva. It looks kind of 
sloppy from the videos.
 

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>> > 
>> >> 
>> >> Which leads me to a point where I can 
>> >> definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private 
>> >> experiences have at least the same reality status as public 
>> >> experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you throw 
>> >> too much of the baby away with the (public) bath water. 
>> >> 
>> >> I don't think there are any experiences which are public and not   
>> >> private. There are experiences, and there are private experiences   
>> >> in which other private experiences are re-presented as public form- 
>> >> functions. 
>> > 
>> > OK, 
>> > 
>> > Cool 
>> > 
>> > Craig 
>> > 
>> > PS Curious if my posts on non-well-founded identity made any sense   
>> > to you...there's a new one: 
>> > 
>> > http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/18/pink-floyd-money/ 
>> > 
>> > 
>> http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/16/non-well-founded-identity-principle/ 
>>
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>> As I explained sometimes ago to Stephen King, non-well-foundness   
>> appears naturally, in many places in computer science, and so is very   
>> interesting, but it does not need to be postulated. 
>> Your posts on your blog are not really intelligible to me. Sorry. 
>>
>
> Postulating it is really only a disclaimer - that what this refers to is 
> intentionally using a set which includes itself. The real substance of what 
> I'm postulating is in the nested relation, where all x is not only simply 
> x, but also it is a continuum of becoming x by its negative universality.
>
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> You should try to explain this like I was a nine years old. 
>

Ok, let's say that the universe is only the visible spectrum. If we wanted 
a really Absolutely complete definition of one color in the spectrum - 
let's say blue, then we would want to reflect the fact that blueness 
includes all of its potential relations with all of the colors that are not 
blue. Blue and red have a certain relation. Blue plays a certain role in 
blue, red, and green, etc. 

That set of {all color relations between blue and any non-blue color} we 
could call the artistic or poetic blue. It is super-personal and allows all 
blue associations to freely commute.

That goes at the top of the integral. It's the maximum number of blue 
associations. The bottom of the integral is the opposite sense of blue, 
which is how blue stands on its own in the most literal terms - like how an 
average person sees electromagnetic wavelength of 500nm.

That integral itself, and here's the tricky part, is nested as well. So 
it's:

         unambiguous blue                                 {scientific 
blue}---------------{artistic blue}  
                         
|                                                                    |
                         |_______________________________________|
                                                            |
                                                            |
                                                         blue

Think of it as a monadology extension. For every blue, there is an 
implication of all that blue can be and cannot be, and there is an 
implication of only one thing that blue can be. In between the two is the 
continuum of each and every instance of what blue actually has been. 

In my analysis, comp can only hit the ends of the continuum. It can compute 
a function that is used as blue would be, and it can contact the arithmetic 
truth of all the possible relations between that function and all other 
functions, but it cannot get inside the continuum. It has the alphabet, and 
it has the entire contents of the internet, but it doesn't have any reason 
to write about anything. It has no events to tie together the elemental and 
the universal, or rather, it has no entropy to separate them.


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> Each aspect of x is defined by the difference between every other identity 
> (not x) and what they cause x to become in their local frame of reference.
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> I was trying to explain 'artistic blue' here - the sum total of all poetic 
> combination potentials between blue and not blue.
>

Craig

 

> ?
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> Bruno
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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