Hi Richard,

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On 25 Sep 2013, at 16:29, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: "Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations.But the imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations(even finite one, now), so it is a monism."Richard: Are you saying that without people there cannot be comp? Iwould prefer a more cosmic machine as in http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194

`Where does such cosmos come from? You start from what I show we have`

`to derive (from arithmetic, which you assume too).`

`Without people, there is no arithmetic, because arithmetic implies`

`(logically) the existence of people (and with comp they are conscious).`

Bruno

On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 25 Sep 2013, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:58:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchalwrote:On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:On Monday, September 23, 2013 1:16:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:shape belongs to the category of numbers imagination, and withcomp this is given by arithmetical relations.Numbers imagination seem like human imagination to me.Nice. That is a reason for taking number's talk seriously.I had more of 'numbers imagination = pathetic fallacy' meaning inmind.OK, but then you beg the question, and just repeat: I believe thatcomp is wrong, without explaining why.It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties onother. To make clear what we assume.That's what I am trying to do - make clear what you assume. If youstart out granting numbers imagination, then you have already haveconsciousness, and have no need for comp.Of course. Comp is an assumption concerning consciousness andcomputations. Then the *conclusion* is that the theory ofeverything is elementary arithmetic.Buy everything that is not obviously elementary arithmetic can justbe presumed to be part of numbers imagination.No, you have to do the math and verify that it predicts correctlywhat we see. Up to now, comp predicts the MW, with a quantumstructure, and a core symmetrical structure (but we have not yetreally its linear aspect, nor the measure istelf, etc.).Comp is not a theory of everything,Indeed. It is a philosophical or theological principle orassumption. Then, if we make that assumption, the theorem is thatthe theory of everything is given by arithmetic or anything Turingequivalent.its a dualism of everything computational vs everything imagined bycomputations.Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But theimagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finiteone, now), so it is a monism.Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, but whywould they have a smell or sound?Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to thedoctor.Yes, you would.Because you assume non-comp, but I still don't see why. Because flavors exist, but comp has no reason to imagine them.Well, the one saying "yes" to the doctor does have a reason to hopefor it, and he can hope that the evidences (the Turing emulabilityof biophysical known object) are not misleading.The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic. I am interested only in the refutability of comp.That may already be biasing the evaluation of comp beyond repair.Consciousness is not about refutability,Doing a precise theory is about making a refutable theory.Depends if the theory is about consciousness or not. Consciousnesscan only be a baseless assertion. It is the base of all assertionand the assertion of all bases.You assume consciousness to be fundamental, and matter. That iscoherent with your non-comp theory, but is not an argument againstcomp.it is about perceiving and participating. Refutability is a secondorder logic derived from that. If you use the weak standard ofrefutability, then you cannot be surprised when we take a puppetfor a person.I can hardly be surprised, because that is mainly what I assume. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJRluXBa4e8Cute, but not quite convincing for the present topic. BrunoCraig BrunoCraig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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