Bruno: "Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But the imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite one, now), so it is a monism."

## Advertising

Richard: Are you saying that without people there cannot be comp? I would prefer a more cosmic machine as in http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194 On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 25 Sep 2013, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:58:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, September 23, 2013 1:16:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> shape belongs to the category of numbers imagination, and with comp this >>> is given by arithmetical relations. >>> >>> >> Numbers imagination seem like human imagination to me. >> >> >> Nice. That is a reason for taking number's talk seriously. >> > > > I had more of 'numbers imagination = pathetic fallacy' meaning in mind. > > > > OK, but then you beg the question, and just repeat: I believe that comp is > wrong, without explaining why. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties on other. To >>> make clear what we assume. >>> >> >> That's what I am trying to do - make clear what you assume. If you start >> out granting numbers imagination, then you have already have consciousness, >> and have no need for comp. >> >> >> Of course. Comp is an assumption concerning consciousness and >> computations. Then the *conclusion* is that the theory of everything is >> elementary arithmetic. >> > > > Buy everything that is not obviously elementary arithmetic can just be > presumed to be part of numbers imagination. > > > No, you have to do the math and verify that it predicts correctly what we > see. Up to now, comp predicts the MW, with a quantum structure, and a core > symmetrical structure (but we have not yet really its linear aspect, nor > the measure istelf, etc.). > > > > Comp is not a theory of everything, > > > Indeed. It is a philosophical or theological principle or assumption. > Then, if we make that assumption, the theorem is that the theory of > everything is given by arithmetic or anything Turing equivalent. > > > > its a dualism of everything computational vs everything imagined by > computations. > > > Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But the > imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite one, > now), so it is a monism. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, but why would >>> they have a smell or sound? >>> >>> >>> Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to the doctor. >>> >> >> Yes, you would. >> >> >> Because you assume non-comp, but I still don't see why. >> > > Because flavors exist, but comp has no reason to imagine them. > > > Well, the one saying "yes" to the doctor does have a reason to hope for > it, and he can hope that the evidences (the Turing emulability of > biophysical known object) are not misleading. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic. >>> >>> I am interested only in the refutability of comp. >>> >> >> That may already be biasing the evaluation of comp beyond repair. >> Consciousness is not about refutability, >> >> >> >> Doing a precise theory is about making a refutable theory. >> > > Depends if the theory is about consciousness or not. Consciousness can > only be a baseless assertion. It is the base of all assertion and the > assertion of all bases. > > > You assume consciousness to be fundamental, and matter. That is coherent > with your non-comp theory, but is not an argument against comp. > > > > > > >> >> >> it is about perceiving and participating. Refutability is a second order >> logic derived from that. If you use the weak standard of refutability, then >> you cannot be surprised when we take a puppet for a person. >> >> >> I can hardly be surprised, because that is mainly what I assume. >> > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJRluXBa4e8 > > > Cute, but not quite convincing for the present topic. > > Bruno > > > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >> Visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >> . >> For more options, visit >> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >> . >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.