Bruno: "Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But the imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite one, now), so it is a monism."
Richard: Are you saying that without people there cannot be comp? I would prefer a more cosmic machine as in http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194 On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 25 Sep 2013, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:58:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, September 23, 2013 1:16:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> shape belongs to the category of numbers imagination, and with comp this >>> is given by arithmetical relations. >>> >>> >> Numbers imagination seem like human imagination to me. >> >> >> Nice. That is a reason for taking number's talk seriously. >> > > > I had more of 'numbers imagination = pathetic fallacy' meaning in mind. > > > > OK, but then you beg the question, and just repeat: I believe that comp is > wrong, without explaining why. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties on other. To >>> make clear what we assume. >>> >> >> That's what I am trying to do - make clear what you assume. If you start >> out granting numbers imagination, then you have already have consciousness, >> and have no need for comp. >> >> >> Of course. Comp is an assumption concerning consciousness and >> computations. Then the *conclusion* is that the theory of everything is >> elementary arithmetic. >> > > > Buy everything that is not obviously elementary arithmetic can just be > presumed to be part of numbers imagination. > > > No, you have to do the math and verify that it predicts correctly what we > see. Up to now, comp predicts the MW, with a quantum structure, and a core > symmetrical structure (but we have not yet really its linear aspect, nor > the measure istelf, etc.). > > > > Comp is not a theory of everything, > > > Indeed. It is a philosophical or theological principle or assumption. > Then, if we make that assumption, the theorem is that the theory of > everything is given by arithmetic or anything Turing equivalent. > > > > its a dualism of everything computational vs everything imagined by > computations. > > > Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But the > imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite one, > now), so it is a monism. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, but why would >>> they have a smell or sound? >>> >>> >>> Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to the doctor. >>> >> >> Yes, you would. >> >> >> Because you assume non-comp, but I still don't see why. >> > > Because flavors exist, but comp has no reason to imagine them. > > > Well, the one saying "yes" to the doctor does have a reason to hope for > it, and he can hope that the evidences (the Turing emulability of > biophysical known object) are not misleading. > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic. >>> >>> I am interested only in the refutability of comp. >>> >> >> That may already be biasing the evaluation of comp beyond repair. >> Consciousness is not about refutability, >> >> >> >> Doing a precise theory is about making a refutable theory. >> > > Depends if the theory is about consciousness or not. Consciousness can > only be a baseless assertion. It is the base of all assertion and the > assertion of all bases. > > > You assume consciousness to be fundamental, and matter. That is coherent > with your non-comp theory, but is not an argument against comp. > > > > > > >> >> >> it is about perceiving and participating. Refutability is a second order >> logic derived from that. If you use the weak standard of refutability, then >> you cannot be surprised when we take a puppet for a person. >> >> >> I can hardly be surprised, because that is mainly what I assume. >> > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJRluXBa4e8 > > > Cute, but not quite convincing for the present topic. > > Bruno > > > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >> Visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >> . >> For more options, visit >> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >> . >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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