You are saying there is no cosmos without people??? Well anyway you pointed out the arithmetic and logic necessary for the cosmos to evolve people and I thank you for that.
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Richard, > > > On 25 Sep 2013, at 16:29, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno: "Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But > the imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite > one, now), so it is a monism." > > Richard: Are you saying that without people there cannot be comp? I would > prefer a more cosmic machine as in http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194 > > > > > Where does such cosmos come from? You start from what I show we have to > derive (from arithmetic, which you assume too). > > Without people, there is no arithmetic, because arithmetic implies > (logically) the existence of people (and with comp they are conscious). > > > Bruno > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 25 Sep 2013, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:58:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, September 23, 2013 1:16:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> shape belongs to the category of numbers imagination, and with comp >>>> this is given by arithmetical relations. >>>> >>>> >>> Numbers imagination seem like human imagination to me. >>> >>> >>> Nice. That is a reason for taking number's talk seriously. >>> >> >> >> I had more of 'numbers imagination = pathetic fallacy' meaning in mind. >> >> >> >> OK, but then you beg the question, and just repeat: I believe that comp >> is wrong, without explaining why. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties on other. To >>>> make clear what we assume. >>>> >>> >>> That's what I am trying to do - make clear what you assume. If you start >>> out granting numbers imagination, then you have already have consciousness, >>> and have no need for comp. >>> >>> >>> Of course. Comp is an assumption concerning consciousness and >>> computations. Then the *conclusion* is that the theory of everything is >>> elementary arithmetic. >>> >> >> >> Buy everything that is not obviously elementary arithmetic can just be >> presumed to be part of numbers imagination. >> >> >> No, you have to do the math and verify that it predicts correctly what we >> see. Up to now, comp predicts the MW, with a quantum structure, and a core >> symmetrical structure (but we have not yet really its linear aspect, nor >> the measure istelf, etc.). >> >> >> >> Comp is not a theory of everything, >> >> >> Indeed. It is a philosophical or theological principle or assumption. >> Then, if we make that assumption, the theorem is that the theory of >> everything is given by arithmetic or anything Turing equivalent. >> >> >> >> its a dualism of everything computational vs everything imagined by >> computations. >> >> >> Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But the >> imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite one, >> now), so it is a monism. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, but why would >>>> they have a smell or sound? >>>> >>>> >>>> Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to the doctor. >>>> >>> >>> Yes, you would. >>> >>> >>> Because you assume non-comp, but I still don't see why. >>> >> >> Because flavors exist, but comp has no reason to imagine them. >> >> >> Well, the one saying "yes" to the doctor does have a reason to hope for >> it, and he can hope that the evidences (the Turing emulability of >> biophysical known object) are not misleading. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic. >>>> >>>> I am interested only in the refutability of comp. >>>> >>> >>> That may already be biasing the evaluation of comp beyond repair. >>> Consciousness is not about refutability, >>> >>> >>> >>> Doing a precise theory is about making a refutable theory. >>> >> >> Depends if the theory is about consciousness or not. Consciousness can >> only be a baseless assertion. It is the base of all assertion and the >> assertion of all bases. >> >> >> You assume consciousness to be fundamental, and matter. That is coherent >> with your non-comp theory, but is not an argument against comp. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> it is about perceiving and participating. Refutability is a second order >>> logic derived from that. If you use the weak standard of refutability, then >>> you cannot be surprised when we take a puppet for a person. >>> >>> >>> I can hardly be surprised, because that is mainly what I assume. >>> >> >> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJRluXBa4e8 >> >> >> Cute, but not quite convincing for the present topic. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>> Visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >>> . >>> For more options, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>> . >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
