Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

```Hello Chris,

On 27 Sep 2013, at 01:51, chris peck wrote:```
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```Hi

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Well Im sure that I am missing something important, but I can't see it so far...
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>>The diary is the one that you have with you. You will not have two
diaries, since you cannot experience being in Moscow and Wsahington at
the same time with contradicting the "survivability" axiom of
COMP. Therefore the probability of the diary containing 'I am in
Washington not Moscow' is decidedly less than 1. That it is precisely
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0.5 is a little more debatable, however, particularly in the later steps.
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ISTM you are thinking about things after the teleportation has occurred.
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Precisely: the expectation evaluation is asked to the person in Helsinki, before the duplication is done, and it concerns where the person asked will feel to be, from his first person point of view.
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If one of the 'me's is asked after teleportation but before the doors are opened what are the chances of being in moscow, then I can see that there is indeterminacy.
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OK. So you can derive the First Person Indeterminacy (FIP) from the Delayed Uncertainty Principle: If I can predict with certainty (modulo default hypothesis) that tomorrow I will feel to be uncertain about some outcome of some experience, then I am already uncertain now about that outcome.
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But the way the step is formulated is that I am asked prior to teleportation:
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Yes.

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"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty."
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And the situations are very different because prior to teleportation there is one me, waiting to be duplicated and sent to both locations. After teleportation there are two 'me's, one at either location. That effects the probabilities, surely?
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That entails there are probabilities! Indeed.

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There is one me befoe the duplication, and two me's after, from the or a third person point of view.
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But, assuming comp, there is always only one "me", from the first person points of view. In Helsinki, you can predict with certainty that you will write in your diary that you are specifically in only one precise city, and the umber of first-person-me has not changed, it is still one. From that view, you inherit a doppelganger in the other city, but it is another "first-person" entity, even if intellectually ( or from a third person view) you can consider that it is a "you".
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If I am sufficiently described by the reading process to maintain 'I'ness then this 'I'ness goes to washington and moscow.
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That is a third person view on the first person view. You are right. But the question in Helsinki concerned the first person view on the first person view.
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Given I am supposed to be a 'comp practitioner' and therefore believe that nothing over and above the data read constitutes 'I' then, when I am asked what chance there is of me experiencing moscow in the future, the probability must be 1. No 1-p indeterminacy.
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The reconstituted "you" in Washington will understand that you were wrong. Or you will suddenly understand the question, as you are force to write "Washington" in the diary (as you feel directly it from the 1p view), and I tell you explicitly that the question was bearing on that.
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The indeterminacy of the situation after teleportation is dependent on an absence of knowledge concerning which 'me' is being asked the question: 'moscow me' or 'washington me'.
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It is your usual "you" in Helsinki, and the question was about the result of an experience "which city", and does not concern your personal identity (later, the thought experience and its follow up *can* provide some light on this, but it is not needed to grasp what I mean by the FPI, and how and why it will make physics a branch of arithmetic/computer-science.
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But the situation prior to teleportation is certain because I know I will be both 'moscow me' and 'washington me'.
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You know (actually bet) that you will be both from a third person point of view, but you know also that each of them will feel unique and see only one city, and the question asked in helsinki concerned the effective localization result you will *feel* to see after the duplication.
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If you like, both diaries will be identical up to the point of teleportation.
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Yes, and they diverge after.

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>> "I disagree that the 'I' concept is illicit in this argument. It is
upfront with the "folk" concept of surviving an artificial brain
transplant. The 'I' is what survives."

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No, I assume comp and assume that comp is sufficient. Them are the rules of the game. I am not arguing that the comp 'I' is illicit. The illicit 'I' is something I feel has to be smuggled in (subconsciously?) to get the feeling of indeterminacy. An intuition, if you will, that despite trying to assume comp and that this description is being sent to both places, 'I' (an illicit I) only ends up at one.
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Formally you identify Bp with Bp & p (I will not insist on this right now).
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You make complex something simple, and which can entirely be explained in third person terms, in iterating the experience. So both the W-guy and the M-guy come back (by usual planes) in Helsinki, and do the WM- duplication again. This will generate four diaries: WW, WM, MW, MM. In helsinki, at the start, you can say, I will be the four guys, but each guys, and you know this in advance, will *feel* to be one among those four. If you iterate the experience a great number of time, it is a exercise in combinatoric and computer science to show that the vast majority of the sequences will be incompressible (and so, strongly random).
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>>That's one of the troubles with intuition pumps. To be quite honest,
that intuition pump fails me

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Perhaps you don't, but it isn't important. I think it is generally accepted, perhaps not on this list, that one would be banging at the walls of the teleporter, screaming to be released, certain of impending death. That kind of intuition. The kind it has been fruitful not to ignore in our evolutionary past. ;)
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In this case, it is simple logic and arithmetic, and grasping the definition.
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I hope you are not stuck, like John Clark, on the 3-view on the 1- views, after the duplication. It is nice of you, and Clark, to attribute consciousness to each copies, but to get the FPI, you have still to listen to them, and get the 1-view on the 1-view, and understand that what they *each* say is the only coherent (with comp) things to say: I am in only one city, I got one bit of information, etc. You have to put yourself in the shoes of each copy.
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In the iterated experience, you can guess, I hope, that the guy having written in the diary:
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WWMMMMMWWWMWWMMWWWMWMMMMW

might recognize he was unable to predict that very sequence in Helsinki.

OK?

Bruno

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```Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2013 09:35:58 +1200
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com

```
The MWI first made me realise that my notion of "I" might be inadequate in more ways than I'd previously imagined. For a while I went around thinking "there's a version of me - and it IS me - who's spontaneously combusting at this moment. And I can't say thank God I'm not her, because I *am* - or the me of a moment ago was (meanwhile another version of me has just mysteriously gained godlike powers...)
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These thoughts used to freak me out a bit. When I later discovered comp it was just "oh....same old, same old..." :)
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