On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> > On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> > >> >>> The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for >> >>> God >> >>> to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has >> >>> different qualia. This is a proof of comp, >> >> >> >> >> >> Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a >> >> prothesis, only >> >> because the qualia is an attribute of the "immaterial person", and >> >> not of >> >> the brain, body, or computer. Then the prosthesis will manifest >> >> the person >> >> if it emulates the correct level. >> > >> > But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical >> > brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates >> > the behaviour but not the qualia? >> > The problem is that it would allow >> > one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the >> > qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. >> >> I agree. >> >> Note that in that case the qualia is no more attributed to an >> immaterial person, but to a piece of primary matter. >> In that case, both comp and functionalism (in your sense, not in >> Putnam's usual sense of functionalism which is a particular case of >> comp) are wrong. >> >> Then, it is almost obvious that an immaterial being cannot distinguish >> between a primarily material incarnation, and an immaterial one, as it >> would need some magic (non Turing emulable) ability to make the >> difference. People agreeing with this do no more need the UDA step 8 >> (which is an attempt to make this more rigorous or clear). >> >> I might criticize, as a devil's advocate, a little bit the partial- >> zombie argument. Very often some people pretend that they feel less >> conscious after some drink of vodka, but that they are still able to >> behave normally. Of course those people are notoriously wrong. It is >> just that alcohol augments a fake self-confidence feeling, which >> typically is not verified (in the laboratory, or more sadly on the >> roads). Also, they confuse "less conscious" with "blurred >> consciousness", > > > Why wouldn't less consciousness have the effect of seeming blurred? If > your battery is dying in a device, the device might begin to fail in > numerous ways, but those are all symptoms of the battery dying - of the > device becoming less reliable as different parts are unavailable at > different times. > > Think of qualia as a character in a long story, which is divided into > episodes. If, for instance, someone starts watching a show like Breaking > Bad only in the last season, they have no explicit understanding of who > Walter White is or why he behaves like he does, where Jesse came from, etc. > They can only pick up what is presented directly in that episode, so his > character is relatively flat. The difference between the appreciation of > the last episode by someone who has seen the entire series on HDTV and > someone who has only read the closed captioning of the last episode on > Twitter is like the difference between a human being's qualia and the > qualia which is available through a logical imitation of a human bring. > > Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other > experiences; specific experiences which directly relate, and extended > experiential contexts which extent to eternity (totality of manifested > events so far relative to the participant plus semi-potential events which > relate to higher octaves of their participation...the bigger picture with > the larger now.) > > > Then qualia are infinite. This contradict some of your previous statement. >
It's not qualia that is finite or infinite, it is finity-infinity itself that is an intellectual quale. Quanta is derived from qualia, so quantitative characteristics have ambiguous application outside of quanta. > > > > > > Human psychology is not a monolith. Blindsight already *proves* that 'we > can be a partial zombie' from our 1p perspective. I have tried to make my > solution to the combination problem here: > http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/ > > What it means is that it is a mistake to say "we can be a partial zombie" > - rather the evidence of brain injuries and surgeries demonstrate that the > extent to which we are who we expect ourselves to be, or that others expect > a person to be, can be changed in many quantitative and qualitative ways. > We may not be less conscious after a massive debilitating stroke, but what > is conscious after that is less of us. > > > OK. > As Chardin said, we are not human beings having from time to time some > divine experiences, but we are divine beings having from time to time human > experiences ... > Right, although I would go further to say that 'here' are experiences which take on qualities of seeming we-ness, seeming human-ness, seeming divinity, etc. What allows the separation of these experiences into qualities is form-ness and function-ness, from which we can derive metric abstractions of space, time, and artithmetic truth. > > > This is because consciousness is not a function or a process, > > > OK > > > it is the sole source of presence. > > Qualia is what we are made of. As human beings at this stage of human > civilization, our direct qualia is primarily cognitive-logical-verbal. We > identify with our ability to describe with words - to qualify other qualia > as verbal qualia. We name our perceptions and name our naming power 'mind', > but that is not consciousness. Logic and intellect can only name > public-facing reductions of certain qualia (visible and tangible qualia - > the stuff of public bodies). The name for those public-facing reductions is > quanta, or numbers, and the totality of the playing field which can be used > for the quanta game is called arithmetic truth. > > > Arithmetical truth is full of non nameable things. Qualia refer to non > verbally describable first person truth. > Can arithmetical truth really name anything? It seems to me that we can use arithmetic truth to locate a number within the infinity of computable realtions, but any 'naming' is only our own attempt to attach a proprietary first person sense to that which is irreducibly generic and nameless. The thing about qualia is not that it is non-nameable, it is the specific aesthetic presence that is manifested. Names are just qualia of mental association - a rose by any other name, etc. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > > Craig > > > >> I think. >> So I think we are in agreement. >> > > Yes, you are both making the same mistake. Conflating the unity of trivial > self-identification with the aesthetic reality of experiential presence. > > > Craig > > > >> (I usually use "functionalism" in Putnam's sense, but your's or >> Chalmers' use is more logical, yet more rarely used in the community >> of philosopher of mind, but that's a vocabulary issue). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > >> >> If not, even me, can do a brain prothesis that reproduce the >> >> consciousness >> >> of a sleeping dreaming person, ... >> >> OK, I guess you mean the full I/O behavior, but for this, I am not >> >> even sure >> >> that my actual current brain can be enough, ... if only because "I" >> >> from the >> >> first person point of view is distributed in infinities of >> >> computations, and >> >> I cannot exclude that the qualia (certainly stable lasting qualia) >> >> might >> >> rely on that. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> provided that brain physics >> >>> is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable. >> >>> Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement >> >>> brain contain a hypercomputer. >> >> >> >> >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> Bruno >> > >> > >> > -- >> > Stathis Papaioannou >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> > send an email to [email protected]. >> > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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