Hi Liz >> This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist >> feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his >> knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about >> arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are "wired" to think in terms >> of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in >> terms of how we think about things in everyday life.
But Bruno is not talking about everyday people or everyday life. He is talking about people who are 'comp practitioners', and people who say 'yes doctor'. If someone genuinely believed in MWI and was aware of all possible outcomes under MWI, then he would not actually experience any uncertainty. >> Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% >> chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being >> the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the >> chance beforehand. I explicitly dealt with that situation, Liz. And Moscow man might feel uncertainty. He might feel all manner of things. But it is not Moscow man who is asked the question, is it? Its Helsinki man. >>So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of >>arriving in Moscow, assuming "folk psychology" is involved (ditto for the >>physicist). How exactly do Moscow/Washington men's uncertainty effect Helsinki man, given Helsinki man is no longer around to be effected? Moreover, Bruno can not on the one hand stipulate that the people in the experiment are 'comp practitioners' who willingly say 'yes doctor' and then on the other hand stipulate their attitudes would actually conform to our 'folk psychology'. Either I am a 'comp practitioner' and my attitudes reflect that, or I am not a 'comp practitioner' would not say 'yes doctor' and my attitudes reflect 'folk psychology'. All the best Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 14:37:12 +1300 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? From: [email protected] To: [email protected] If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are "wired" to think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life. Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming "folk psychology" is involved (ditto for the physicist). However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday attitude often doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
