Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel).
Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible arithmetical truth can produce the physical. Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours. On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 10:53 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 15 Oct 2013, at 13:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> > >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> >> Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM >> Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics >> To: [email protected] >> >> >> >> >> >> 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> >> >>> Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized >>> brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In >>> everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. >>> >>> Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was >>> claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by "the" or "a" >>> machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that >>> it was only computed. How does Bruno show that "all the rest" which >>> presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly >>> confusing me. >>> >>> >> Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the >> sum of the infinity of computations going through your state.... as it is >> defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not "computed". >> >> A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an >> infinity of computations. >> >> Quentin >> > > > No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the infinite > set of computations going through your current state (at every state, an > infinity of computations diverge, but there is still an infinity going > through that state and it's for every state). > > > Yes. It generalizes what Everett did on the universal quantum wave, on the > whole arithmetical truth (which contains the whole computer science > theoretical truth). If QM is correct, the SWE is redundant, and a > consequence of comp. Physics is one aspect of arithmetic seen by its > internal creatures (the universal or not numbers). We can concretely > extract physics from the interview of the chatty rich one (the Löbian > numbers). > > Bruno > > > > > Quentin > >> >> >> You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed. >> That does not make sense. >> Richard >> >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: >>>> >>>> On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: >>>> >>>> On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote: >>>> >>>> On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote: >>>> >>>> So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a >>>> measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another? Do they >>>> divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely >>>> many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure >>>> produces the right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning >>>> a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that >>>> square numbers?). >>>> >>>> And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule >>>> derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, >>>> Chris Fuchs? >>>> >>>> >>>> If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences", >>>> (then), disappearing, please do. >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't understand the question. What parallel experiences do you >>>> refer to? And you're asking why they disappeared? >>>> >>>> >>>> The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be >>>> contagious on the observer" >>>> >>>> >>>> I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so >>>> superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics. >>>> >>>> >>>> But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon >>>> interference in the two slits experiment. >>>> >>>> >>>> ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single >>>> photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of >>>> observer required. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely >>>> mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the >>>> "quantum wave" describes only psychological states, but they concern still >>>> a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many >>>> self-multiplication. >>>> >>>> >>>> There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal >>>> subjective probabilities of contemplated futures. >>>> >>>> >>>> I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"? >>>> >>>> >>>> Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified. >>>> >>>> >>>> OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the >>>> real, which is a bit weird to me. >>>> >>>> >>>> The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible >>>> futures. Or even the result of considering all possible paths. >>>> >>>> >>>> That leads to instrumentalism. That is "don"t ask, don't try to >>>> understand or get a bigger picture". >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the >>>> superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not >>>> a problem for me. there are still "many". >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours. >>>> I think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at >>>> the end of his book "The Evolution of Reason" - a probabilistic extension >>>> of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in "Interview >>>> with a Quantum Bayesian", arXiv:1207.2141v1 >>>> >>>> >>>> OK. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> It is still Everett wave as seen from inside. >>>> >>>> We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal) >>>> physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp. >>>> >>>> Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is >>>> the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of >>>> solipsism, and it can generate some strong "don't ask" imperative. >>>> >>>> >>>> You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected. >>>> >>>> >>>> I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think >>>> you do the same). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, >>>> itself define by a relative universal numbers. >>>> >>>> >>>> Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his >>>> actions. >>>> >>>> Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its octalist >>>> points of view, and an whole theology including his physics, etc. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally >>>> comfortable with not explaining everything. >>>> >>>> >>>> Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using. >>>> >>>> >>>> What's your explanation for the existence of persons? So far what I've >>>> heard is that it's an inside view of arithmetic - which I don't find very >>>> enlightening. >>>> >>>> >>>> What do you miss in the UDA? >>>> >>>> >>>> As I understand it the UD computes everything computable and it's only >>>> your inference that observers (and the rest of the multiverse) *must be in >>>> there somewhere* because you've assumed that everything is computable. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is >>>> computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, >>>> or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Fuchs, correctly I think, says an 'interpretation' of a theory, the >>>> story that goes along with the mathematics, is important insofar as it >>>> gives you insight into how to apply the mathematics and to extend your >>>> theories. He is critical of Everett's MWI for not doing that, or at least >>>> not doing it well. >>>> >>>> >>>> Well, perhaps Fuchs is a bit out of topic, once you agree that it is >>>> only Everett in a psychological version. >>>> >>>> >>>> It's kinda funny to see "only...psychological" from a guy who wants to >>>> show that everything is a shared dream. >>>> >>>> >>>> I said that just to say that comp is both on Fuchs' side, and on >>>> Everett's side. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> That is close to comp. But comp leads, by UDA, that the theory of >>>> everuthing is just elementary arithmetic (or Turing equivalent, like >>>> colmbinatirs, ...). Then everything is defined in a very precise way in >>>> that theory. >>>> >>>> >>>> Is it? What's an electron then? What's John K. Clark? I don't see >>>> that these things are defined *in that theory* at all. >>>> >>>> >>>> ? >>>> This is a consequence of already the step seven. Of course a question >>>> like "what is an electron" remains an open problem, but we know the shape >>>> of the answer: an electron is a relatively stable information pattern in >>>> the FPI of all universal numbers. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> And this explains both 100% matter and 99,999... % of consciousness. >>>> The explanation might be false, of course, but is testable. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a >>>> lack of integrity." >>>> --- Fredrick Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols" >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> No virus found in this message. >>>> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >>>> Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3614/6742 - Release Date: >>>> 10/11/13 >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> No virus found in this message. >>>> Checked by AVG - 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