On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 2:30 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

>  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
> measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
> divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
> many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
> produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
> a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
> square numbers?).
>
> And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives
> from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs?
>
>
>  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences",
> (then), disappearing, please do.
>
>
> I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer
> to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?
>
>
>  The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be contagious
> on the observer"
>
>
> I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
> superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.
>
>
>  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
> interference in the two slits experiment.
>
>
> ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
> photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
> observer required.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
> "quantum wave" describes only psychological states, but they concern still
> a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
> self-multiplication.
>
>
> There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
> subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.
>
>
>  I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?
>
>
> Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.
>
>
>  OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the real,
> which is a bit weird to me.
>
>
> The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.
> Or even the result of considering all possible paths.
>
>
>

According to Fuchs, who does the consideration have to be made by?
 Obviously no person (nor any practical classical computer) could
contemplate all possible paths of a large quantum computation.  So whose
contemplation reifies or interferes with the product of that computation?

Jason


>
>
>
>
>  I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the
> superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not
> a problem for me. there are still "many".
>
>
>
> Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I
> think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at
> the end of his book "The Evolution of Reason" - a probabilistic extension
> of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in "Interview
> with a Quantum Bayesian", arXiv:1207.2141v1
>
>
>  OK.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.
>
>  We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)
> physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.
>
>  Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is
> the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of
> solipsism, and it can generate some strong "don't ask" imperative.
>
>
> You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.
>
>
>  I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.
>
>
>
> I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think you
> do the same).
>
>
>
>  What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs, itself
> define by a relative universal numbers.
>
>
> Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his
> actions.
>
>
>  Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its octalist
> points of view, and an whole theology including his physics, etc.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally
> comfortable with not explaining everything.
>
>
>  Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.
>
>
> What's your explanation for the existence of persons?  So far what I've
> heard is that it's an inside view of arithmetic - which I don't find very
> enlightening.
>
>
>  What do you miss in the UDA?
>
>
> As I understand it the UD computes everything computable and it's only
> your inference that observers (and the rest of the multiverse) *must be in
> there somewhere* because you've assumed that everything is computable.
>
>
>
>
>  Fuchs, correctly I think, says an 'interpretation' of a theory, the
> story that goes along with the mathematics, is important insofar as it
> gives you insight into how to apply the mathematics and to extend your
> theories.  He is critical of Everett's MWI for not doing that, or at least
> not doing it well.
>
>
>  Well, perhaps Fuchs is a bit out of topic, once you agree that it is
> only Everett in a psychological version.
>
>
> It's kinda funny to see "only...psychological" from a guy who wants to
> show that everything is a shared dream.
>
>
>  That is close to comp. But comp leads, by UDA, that the theory of
> everuthing is just elementary arithmetic (or Turing equivalent, like
> colmbinatirs, ...). Then everything is defined in a very precise way in
> that theory.
>
>
> Is it?  What's an electron then?  What's John K. Clark?  I don't see that
> these things are defined *in that theory* at all.
>
> Brent
>
>
>  And this explains both 100% matter and 99,999... % of consciousness. The
> explanation might be false, of course, but is testable.
>
>  Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
>
>  Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Brent
> "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a
> lack of integrity."
>     --- Fredrick Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols"
>
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