2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>

>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>
> Date: Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 6:54 AM
> Subject: Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
>
>
>
> 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>
>
>> Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized
>> brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In
>> everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.
>>
>> Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was
>> claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by "the" or "a"
>> machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that
>> it was only computed. How does Bruno show that "all the rest" which
>> presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly
>> confusing me.
>>
>>
> Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the
> sum of the infinity of computations going through your state.... as it is
> defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not "computed".
>
> A piece of matter (or you fwiw) below the substitution level is an
> infinity of computations.
>
> Quentin
>


No I'm saying, that matter/you is not *a* computation, but the infinite set
of computations going through your current state (at every state, an
infinity of computations diverge, but there is still an infinity going
through that state and it's for every state).

Quentin

>
>
> You seem to be saying that the infinity of computations are not computed.
> That does not make sense.
> Richard
>
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 10/14/2013 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>  On 13 Oct 2013, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 10/13/2013 1:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>  On 12 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 10/12/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>  On 11 Oct 2013, at 03:25, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>   So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a
>>> measurement.  How are these universes distinct from one another?   Do they
>>> divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely
>>> many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure
>>> produces the right proportion?  Do you not see any problems with assigning
>>> a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that
>>> square numbers?).
>>>
>>> And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule
>>> derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example,
>>> Chris Fuchs?
>>>
>>>
>>>  If you can explain to me how this makes the parallel "experiences",
>>> (then), disappearing, please do.
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't understand the question.  What parallel experiences do you refer
>>> to?  And you're asking why they disappeared?
>>>
>>>
>>>  The question is "how does Fuchs prevent a superposition to be
>>> contagious on the observer"
>>>
>>>
>>> I think he takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function - so
>>> superpositions are just something that happens in the mathematics.
>>>
>>>
>>>  But then I don't see how this could fit with even just the one photon
>>> interference in the two slits experiment.
>>>
>>>
>>> ?? The math predicts probabilities of events, including where a single
>>> photon will land in a Young's slit experiment - no superposition of
>>> observer required.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But it illustrates that superposition is physical/real, not purely
>>> mathematical. Then linearity expands it to us.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  When I read Fuchs I thought this: Comp suggest a compromise: yes the
>>> "quantum wave" describes only psychological states, but they concern still
>>> a *many* dreams/worlds/physical-realities, including the many
>>> self-multiplication.
>>>
>>>
>>> There is no "many" in Fuchs interpretation, there is only the personal
>>> subjective probabilities of contemplated futures.
>>>
>>>
>>>  I notice the plural of "futures". Are those not "many"?
>>>
>>>
>>> Sure, but they are contemplated, not reified.
>>>
>>>
>>>  OK. But apparently object of contemplation can interfere with the
>>> real, which is a bit weird to me.
>>>
>>>
>>> The 'interference' is a calculational event 'between' possible futures.
>>> Or even the result of considering all possible paths.
>>>
>>>
>>> That leads to instrumentalism. That is "don"t ask, don't try to
>>> understand or get a bigger picture".
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  I know Fuchs criticize Everett, but I don't see how he makes the
>>> superposition disappearing. he only makes them psychological, which is not
>>> a problem for me. there are still "many".
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, that's why I said I think his approach is consistent with yours.  I
>>> think Fuchs view of QM is similar to what William S. Cooper calls for at
>>> the end of his book "The Evolution of Reason" - a probabilistic extension
>>> of logic. This is essentially the view he defends at length in "Interview
>>> with a Quantum Bayesian", arXiv:1207.2141v1
>>>
>>>
>>>  OK.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  It is still Everett wave as seen from inside.
>>>
>>>  We just don't know if the dreams defined an unique (multiversal)
>>> physical reality. Neither in Everett +GR, nor in comp.
>>>
>>>  Bayesian epistemic view is no problem, but you have to define what is
>>> the knower, the observer, etc. If not, it falls into a cosmic form of
>>> solipsism, and it can generate some strong "don't ask" imperative.
>>>
>>>
>>> You assume that if others are not explained they must be rejected.
>>>
>>>
>>>  I just ask for an explanation of the terms that they introduce.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think he takes the observer as primitive and undefined (and I think
>>> you do the same).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  What? Not at all. the observer is defined by its set of beliefs,
>>> itself define by a relative universal numbers.
>>>
>>>
>>> Fuchs defines 'the observer' as the one who bets on the outcome of his
>>> actions.
>>>
>>>  Comp has a pretty well defined notion of observer, with its octalist
>>> points of view, and an whole theology including his physics, etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  Physicists, like Fuchs, and unlike philosophers, are generally
>>> comfortable with not explaining everything.
>>>
>>>
>>>  Me too. but he has still to explain the terms that he is using.
>>>
>>>
>>> What's your explanation for the existence of persons?  So far what I've
>>> heard is that it's an inside view of arithmetic - which I don't find very
>>> enlightening.
>>>
>>>
>>>  What do you miss in the UDA?
>>>
>>>
>>> As I understand it the UD computes everything computable and it's only
>>> your inference that observers (and the rest of the multiverse) *must be in
>>> there somewhere* because you've assumed that everything is computable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is
>>> computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything,
>>> or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  Fuchs, correctly I think, says an 'interpretation' of a theory, the
>>> story that goes along with the mathematics, is important insofar as it
>>> gives you insight into how to apply the mathematics and to extend your
>>> theories.  He is critical of Everett's MWI for not doing that, or at least
>>> not doing it well.
>>>
>>>
>>>  Well, perhaps Fuchs is a bit out of topic, once you agree that it is
>>> only Everett in a psychological version.
>>>
>>>
>>> It's kinda funny to see "only...psychological" from a guy who wants to
>>> show that everything is a shared dream.
>>>
>>>
>>> I said that just to say that comp is both on Fuchs' side, and on
>>> Everett's side.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  That is close to comp. But comp leads, by UDA, that the theory of
>>> everuthing is just elementary arithmetic (or Turing equivalent, like
>>> colmbinatirs, ...). Then everything is defined in a very precise way in
>>> that theory.
>>>
>>>
>>> Is it?  What's an electron then?  What's John K. Clark?  I don't see
>>> that these things are defined *in that theory* at all.
>>>
>>>
>>> ?
>>> This is a consequence of already the step seven. Of course a question
>>> like "what is an electron" remains an open problem, but we know the shape
>>> of the answer: an electron is a relatively stable information pattern in
>>> the FPI of all universal numbers.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>  And this explains both 100% matter and 99,999... % of consciousness.
>>> The explanation might be false, of course, but is testable.
>>>
>>>  Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>  Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>> "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a
>>> lack of integrity."
>>>     --- Fredrick Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols"
>>>
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