(And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it comes to duplication.)

I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter: "I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the dilemma, since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory, only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will appear to be the case for observers." He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of observers, despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying: "Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense* that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle." So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists, including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College: Everett: Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an observer making a sequence of results of observations on a number of, let's say, originally identical object systems. At the end of this sequence there is a large superposition of states, each element of which contains the observer as having recorded a particular definite sequence of the results of observation. I identify a single element as what we think of as an experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert that all of the elements simultaneously coexist. In any single element of the final superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently random sequence of events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost all of the elements of the final supeprosition the frequencies of the results of measurements will be in accord with what one predicts from the ordinary picture of quantum mechanics. That is very briefly it. Podolsky: Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or parallel worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much. Everett: Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition principle that each separate element of the superposition will obey the same laws independent of the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why insist on having certain selection of one of the elements as being real and all of the others somehow mysteriously vanishing? Furry: This means that each of us, you see, exists on a great many sheets or versions and it's only on this one right here that you have any particular remembrance of the past. In some other ones we perhaps didn't come here to Cincinnati. Everett: We simply do away with the reduction of the wave packet. Poldolsky: It's certainly consistent as far as we have heard it. Everett: All of the consistency of ordinary physics is preserved by the correlation structure of this state. Podolsky: It looks like we would have a non-denumberable infinity of worlds. Everett: Yes. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.