(And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it comes
to duplication.)

I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter:

"I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the dilemma,
since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the
conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic
postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state
during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory,
only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will
appear to be the case for observers."

He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of observers,
despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying:

"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr,
since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on
the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense* that there
is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations
imposed by the uncertainty principle."

So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic
from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic
(random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person
view.  Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic
wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict
their next experience.

Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists,
including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene
Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College:

Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an observer
making a sequence of results of observations on a number of, let's say,
originally identical object systems. At the end of this sequence there is a
large superposition of states, each element of which contains the observer
as having recorded a particular definite sequence of the results of
observation. I identify a single element as what we think of as an
experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert that all of the
elements simultaneously coexist.  In any single element of the final
superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which
describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently
random sequence of events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events
in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large
series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost
all of the elements of the final supeprosition the frequencies of the
results of measurements will be in accord with what one predicts from the
ordinary picture of quantum mechanics. That is very briefly it.

Podolsky: Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or parallel
worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much.

Everett: Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition principle that each
separate element of the superposition will obey the same laws independent
of the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why insist on having
certain selection of one of the elements as being real and all of the
others somehow mysteriously vanishing?

Furry: This means that each of us, you see, exists on a great many sheets
or versions and it's only on this one right here that you have any
particular remembrance of the past. In some other ones we perhaps didn't
come here to Cincinnati.

Everett: We simply do away with the reduction of the wave packet.

Poldolsky: It's certainly consistent as far as we have heard it.

Everett: All of the consistency of ordinary physics is preserved by the
correlation structure of this state.

Podolsky: It looks like we would have a non-denumberable infinity of worlds.

Everett: Yes.

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