On Oct 16, 2013, at 2:38 AM, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote:



>> But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement.

Quite, it arises from a mistake which would vanish in a true 'comp practitioner'.

The feeling that although I would become each observer and therefore experience each outcome, an erronious 'real me' would only follow one or the other path. And the fake comp practitioner would therefore not be certain of which outcome this 'real me' would experience.

A genuine 'comp practitioner' would be immune to this fallacy and within him/her no such subjective uncertainty would arise. Being subjectively certain about the future, she would assign a probability of one to both outcomes. She would know that each outcome would occur and she would know that she would become each observer. And she would know that there was nothing else to know. That being the case it would be impossible for subjective uncertainty to arise.

I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective. I refer you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%.

There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different experiences. For some class of those experiencers you can attach the label "chris peck". This allows you to say: "chris peck experiences all outcomes" but that does not imply each experiencer experiences all experiences, each experiencer has only one experience. The subjective first person view, of what any experiencer can claim to experience, is a single outcome. The experiences are fractured and distinct because there is no communication between the decohered worlds.

In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which is enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA.

Jason




From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: For John Clark
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 09:15:51 +0200


On 16 Oct 2013, at 05:10, LizR wrote:

On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle."

So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience.

Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have all the available experiences. It's only after the measurement has been made that there is an appearance of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement.

It comes from the fact that each multiplied observers has only one first person view on herself. (And that comes rom the fact that the personal diary is multiplied along with the body of the observer).
She will not "feel the split", nor even notice any split.

Bruno



(However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???)

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