On Oct 16, 2013, at 2:38 AM, chris peck <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling)
that there is only one observer, both before and after the
measurement.
Quite, it arises from a mistake which would vanish in a true 'comp
practitioner'.
The feeling that although I would become each observer and therefore
experience each outcome, an erronious 'real me' would only follow
one or the other path. And the fake comp practitioner would
therefore not be certain of which outcome this 'real me' would
experience.
A genuine 'comp practitioner' would be immune to this fallacy and
within him/her no such subjective uncertainty would arise. Being
subjectively certain about the future, she would assign a
probability of one to both outcomes. She would know that each
outcome would occur and she would know that she would become each
observer. And she would know that there was nothing else to know.
That being the case it would be impossible for subjective
uncertainty to arise.
I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective. I refer
you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM
probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%.
There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different
experiences. For some class of those experiencers you can attach the
label "chris peck". This allows you to say: "chris peck experiences
all outcomes" but that does not imply each experiencer experiences all
experiences, each experiencer has only one experience. The subjective
first person view, of what any experiencer can claim to experience, is
a single outcome. The experiences are fractured and distinct because
there is no communication between the decohered worlds.
In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective
randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths,
which is enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA.
Jason
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: For John Clark
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 09:15:51 +0200
On 16 Oct 2013, at 05:10, LizR wrote:
On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and
Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and
deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is
probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers
to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the
uncertainty principle."
So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully
deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to
probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective
observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete
knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its
entire evolution could not predict their next experience.
Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have
all the available experiences. It's only after the measurement has
been made that there is an appearance of probability, with each
duplicate feeling that he has experienced a probablistic event. But
that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that
there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement.
It comes from the fact that each multiplied observers has only one
first person view on herself. (And that comes rom the fact that the
personal diary is multiplied along with the body of the observer).
She will not "feel the split", nor even notice any split.
Bruno
(However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???)
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
