On 16 Oct 2013, at 19:48, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
> It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book
I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-)
Did Everett use the word "non-denumerable" in that book? I must have
missed it. What page?
> So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which
creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to
first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how
the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation
to two locations.
And I don't understand the difference between "first person
uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty.
> Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI
but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA?
In Bruno's United Dance Association proof, and in Everett's
interpretation, and in every other interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics, and in classical physics too, John Clark doesn't know
what John Clark is going to see next. So what?
It is not because some indeterminacy can be phenomenological than they
can't have different reason/origin.
But if you agree that the FPI is phenomenologically equivalent with a
coin throwing, then you can proceed to step 4.
Bruno
John K Clark
Jason
On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 10:50 AM, John Clark <[email protected]>
wrote:
When I saw the title of this thread I was in a quandary over if I
should open it or not. It said it was for John Clark so it must be
for me, but it can't be for me because it said it was for those "who
ignore the importance of first person views" and subjectivity is the
most important thing in the universe, or at least it is in my
opinion. In the end I flipped a coin, it cane out tails so I opened
it. I didn't read anything I disagreed with or hadn't seen before
with one exception. I already knew Everett believed in a infinity of
worlds but this is the first time I heard him say they were non-
denumerable, so I'm glad I opened it.
John K Clark
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
(And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it
comes to duplication.)
I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter:
"I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the
dilemma, since it results from what is inherently a simplification
of the conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the
basic postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic
jump in state during the process of measurement--from the remaining
very simple theory, only to recover again this very same picture as
a deduction of what will appear to be the case for observers."
He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of
observers, despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying:
"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and
Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and
deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is
probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers
to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the
uncertainty principle."
So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully
deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to
probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective
observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete
knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its
entire evolution could not predict their next experience.
Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists,
including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene
Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College:
Everett:
Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an
observer making a sequence of results of observations on a number
of, let's say, originally identical object systems. At the end of
this sequence there is a large superposition of states, each element
of which contains the observer as having recorded a particular
definite sequence of the results of observation. I identify a single
element as what we think of as an experience, but still hold that it
is tenable to assert that all of the elements simultaneously
coexist. In any single element of the final superposition after all
these measurements, you have a state which describes the observer as
having observed a quite definite and apparently random sequence of
events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events in each
element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large
series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for
almost all of the elements of the final supeprosition the
frequencies of the results of measurements will be in accord with
what one predicts from the ordinary picture of quantum mechanics.
That is very briefly it.
Podolsky: Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or
parallel worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much.
Everett: Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition principle that
each separate element of the superposition will obey the same laws
independent of the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why
insist on having certain selection of one of the elements as being
real and all of the others somehow mysteriously vanishing?
Furry: This means that each of us, you see, exists on a great many
sheets or versions and it's only on this one right here that you
have any particular remembrance of the past. In some other ones we
perhaps didn't come here to Cincinnati.
Everett: We simply do away with the reduction of the wave packet.
Poldolsky: It's certainly consistent as far as we have heard it.
Everett: All of the consistency of ordinary physics is preserved by
the correlation structure of this state.
Podolsky: It looks like we would have a non-denumberable infinity of
worlds.
Everett: Yes.
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