On 17 Oct 2013, at 16:53, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 1:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> And I don't understand the difference between "first person
uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty.
> The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic.
As I've said many times, being deterministic and being predictable
is NOT the same thing. Even if we restrict ourselves to just
Newtonian physics something can be 100% deterministic and still be
100% unpredictable even in theory. Even with all the information in
the world sometimes the only way to know what something will do is
watch it an see because by the time you've finished the calculation
about what it will do it will have already done it.
True, but non relevant.
> POV plays a role.
It's not exactly a grand new discovery that point of view can play a
role.
Then why don't you take into account. If it is so easy, please proceed
to step 4.
> So as I said to you before, be consistent and reject MWI. If you
accept assigning a probability of seeing spin up/down before
measuring, you should accept the same for Bruno's thought
experiment, or you must reject both
I have absolutely no objection to assigning probability when it is
appropriate to do so, but I do object to using probability to assign
identity,
No identity is ever assigned. I showed this more than one. You come
back circularly on points without having answer or comment the
relevant posts with the previews explanation.
because predictions, both good ones and bad, have nothing to do with
a feeling of self.
This is not entirely true either. Even if you just throw a dice, you
have to stay yourself in the process to win or lose a game of chance.
usually this is an implicit default assumption, but to do the math, we
have to take this into account (and later will explain the role of the
"& Dt" arithmetical nuance) (I say this for those interested in the
math).
> or look like a fool.
In Bruno's thought experiment [YOU] walk into a duplicating chamber
and Bruno asks after the duplication, that is to say after you has
been duplicated, what is the probability that [YOU] will see this or
that.
For the billion times, this is wrong, and even nonsensical, and will
never see any post or papers or book by me saying such a stupidity.
You did this already. Please stop.
The evaluation of the probability is asked to the H-man. He has to
write it in his diary in Helsinki. Only the validation/non-validation
of the prediction is done after, by each copies.
When John Clark asks "who is you?" Bruno responds that he could no
more answer that question than he could square a circle.
The quote, please.
But even though Bruno admits that he doesn't know what he means when
he says [YOU] he still demands to know what [YOU] will see. So who's
the real fool around here?
YOU
(You criticize things I never say. Please provide the quotes).
You agreed on the FPI, as you admit it is like throwing a coin, which
was exactly my point, so proceed to step 4, where you will see an
invariance for that FPI, which is not definable in term of coin
throwing. This might help you to get the idea and where we are are
going to.
Ask specific questions.
Bruno
John K Clark
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