On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

## Advertising

> On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>wrote: > > > It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I >> obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) >> > > Did Everett use the word "non-denumerable" in that book? I must have > missed it. What page? > I will have to check later. But I found the page in Google books (but it shows now page number unfortunately): http://books.google.com/books?id=dqgqPjqIyJoC&pg=PT204&dq=All+of+the+consistency+of+ordinary+physics+is+preserved+by+the+correlation+structure+of+this+state.&hl=en&sa=X&ei=uuJeUqGFL-iMyAGn84HYDQ&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=All%20of%20the%20consistency%20of%20ordinary%20physics%20is%20preserved%20by%20the%20correlation%20structure%20of%20this%20state.&f=false > > > So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which >> creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first >> person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can >> arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations. >> > > And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" > and plain old fashioned uncertainty. > The difference is that first person uncertainty remains even in cases when the entire system and its evolution is known. For example, a deterministic program running on a computer whose evolution can be entirely predicted. If it forks into two paths and those paths diverge, an AI or any other conscious entity within that program cannot from their point of view predict their experience after the fork, despite that the entire process is deterministic and in principle could be entirely derived beforehand. > > > Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but >> not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA? >> > > In Bruno's United Dance Association proof, and in Everett's > interpretation, and in every other interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and > in classical physics too, John Clark doesn't know what John Clark is going > to see next. So what? > if you agree with that, move on to the next steps and see how the computational theory of mind, together with arithmetical realism, necessarily lead to the appearance of a physical world. That is the "so what", a falsifiable theory of everything that arises from among the barest set of starting assumptions, and explains many aspects of quantum mechanics. Jason > > John K Clark > > > > > > > > > > > > >> >> Jason >> >> >> >> On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 10:50 AM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> When I saw the title of this thread I was in a quandary over if I should >>> open it or not. It said it was for John Clark so it must be for me, but it >>> can't be for me because it said it was for those "who ignore the importance >>> of first person views" and subjectivity is the most important thing in the >>> universe, or at least it is in my opinion. In the end I flipped a coin, it >>> cane out tails so I opened it. I didn't read anything I disagreed with or >>> hadn't seen before with one exception. I already knew Everett believed in a >>> infinity of worlds but this is the first time I heard him say they were >>> non-denumerable, so I'm glad I opened it. >>> >>> John K Clark >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>wrote: >>> >>>> (And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it >>>> comes to duplication.) >>>> >>>> I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter: >>>> >>>> >>>> "I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the >>>> dilemma, since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the >>>> conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic >>>> postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state >>>> during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory, >>>> only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will >>>> appear to be the case for observers." >>>> >>>> He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of >>>> observers, despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying: >>>> >>>> "Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and >>>> Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and >>>> yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong >>>> sense*that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better >>>> than the >>>> limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle." >>>> >>>> So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully >>>> deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic >>>> (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person >>>> view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic >>>> wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict >>>> their next experience. >>>> >>>> >>>> Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists, >>>> including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene >>>> Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College: >>>> >>>> Everett: >>>> Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an >>>> observer making a sequence of results of observations on a number of, let's >>>> say, originally identical object systems. At the end of this sequence there >>>> is a large superposition of states, each element of which contains the >>>> observer as having recorded a particular definite sequence of the results >>>> of observation. I identify a single element as what we think of as an >>>> experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert that all of the >>>> elements simultaneously coexist. In any single element of the final >>>> superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which >>>> describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently >>>> random sequence of events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events >>>> in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large >>>> series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost >>>> all of the elements of the final supeprosition the frequencies of the >>>> results of measurements will be in accord with what one predicts from the >>>> ordinary picture of quantum mechanics. That is very briefly it. >>>> >>>> >>>> Podolsky: Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or parallel >>>> worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much. >>>> >>>> Everett: Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition principle that >>>> each separate element of the superposition will obey the same laws >>>> independent of the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why insist on >>>> having certain selection of one of the elements as being real and all of >>>> the others somehow mysteriously vanishing? >>>> >>>> Furry: This means that each of us, you see, exists on a great many >>>> sheets or versions and it's only on this one right here that you have any >>>> particular remembrance of the past. In some other ones we perhaps didn't >>>> come here to Cincinnati. >>>> >>>> Everett: We simply do away with the reduction of the wave packet. >>>> >>>> Poldolsky: It's certainly consistent as far as we have heard it. >>>> >>>> Everett: All of the consistency of ordinary physics is preserved by the >>>> correlation structure of this state. >>>> >>>> Podolsky: It looks like we would have a non-denumberable infinity of >>>> worlds. >>>> >>>> Everett: Yes. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.