2013/10/17 chris peck <[email protected]> > Hi jason > > > *>>I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective. * > > In what way? > > Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective? > Have you ever seen an rock quivering in doubt? Certainty/uncertainty are > properties of 1-p experiences and can't be anything but. > > > *>>I refer you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM > probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%.* > > Are you going to show an error of reasoning or are you going to point to a > dead physicist? > > I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of > > http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 > > > *>> There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different > experiences. For some class of those experiencers you can attach the label > "chris peck". This allows you to say: "chris peck experiences all outcomes" > but that does not imply each experiencer experiences all experiences, each > experiencer has only one experience. The subjective first person view, of > what any experiencer can claim to experience, is a single outcome. The > experiences are fractured and distinct because there is no communication > between the decohered worlds. * > > ISTM that you're missing the point of my argument. You don't seem to get > that it is very well understood that there is only one stream of experience > per 'I'. The trouble is that in step 3 these 'I's get duplicated from one > 'I' to two 'I's AND I am obliged axiomatically to assume my 'I'ness > survives in both duplicates. > > So, when asked what will I experience ... and remember, there is only one > 'I' at this point ... how can I answer 'either or' without violating this > axiom I am obliged to accept? Alternatively, perhaps neither of the future > 'I's are this earlier 'I'. In which case, I am forced to predict I will > experience nothing and again that violates the axiom. The only choice I can > make here is to predict this single 'I' will experience each outcome once > duplicated. This is the only prediction I can make which doesn't violate > the survival axiom I am bound to. > > > *>> In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective > randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which is > enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA.* > > On the contrary, Jason, I find the concept of subjective uncertainty > extremely unlikely in both MWI and COMP and find the 50/50 prediction > particularly a little bit silly. > > So, if you have to predict if you'll get spin up or down, you'll predict 100% seeing sping up and 100% seeing spin down ? And so, that proves your theory is wrong (MWI true or not)... no need to go further.
Quentin > Nevertheless, I am not Clark, and have already raced ahead. I find myself > tracking dropped pens through UD*, wallowing in a morass of an unseemly > dream argument and furrowing my brow over strange interpretations of modal > logic. Im not sure what to make of any of it but Im certain Bruno is happy > to have you on board. > > regards. > > > > ------------------------------ > Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 11:36:06 +1300 > > Subject: Re: For John Clark > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > > > On 17 October 2013 09:49, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" > and plain old fashioned uncertainty. > > The difference arises when you are the system which is behaving > probablistically. Presumably a sentient dice (or die*) would feel the same > way. > > * "Take the dice or die!" as my son once said while playing Monopoly. He > was just being pedantic but it got my attention. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
