On Saturday, October 26, 2013 3:30:11 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
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> On 25 Oct 2013, at 19:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>
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> On Friday, October 25, 2013 10:11:04 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
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>> On 24 Oct 2013, at 18:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>>
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>> On Thursday, October 24, 2013 10:16:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Oct 2013, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>> <snip>
>>>
>>> "My problem is that you need   
>>> to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark."
>>>
>>> Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math 
>>> instead?
>>>
>>>
>>> With comp, when you test the flavor of coffee, you do, actually,  test 
>>> the flavor of some math. 
>>>
>>
>> That's what I am saying. It would have to be the case under comp. My 
>> point though is that it is absurd. Tasting something gives us no 
>> mathematical understanding.
>>
>>
>> It does. It might teach you what math looks like from inside. 
>>
>
> If that were true, then the same math could not be expressed as both a 
> sound or an image, but we know that it can. 
>
>
> It depends which math. Some theories are categorical (defined completely 
> the objects), and some are not and can corresponds to many realities. 
>

What mathematical categories could correspond to a sound?
 

>
>
> For math to have an interior that looked like something, there would have 
> to be some mathematical expression which only has an interior which is 
> visible rather than auditory, olfactory, etc. 
>
>
> But I have shown that such math not only exist, but develop through 
> machine self-reference.
>

Is that true though, or do you just want it to be true?

I don't think that machine self-reference makes the development of any 
particular sense modality. You're just exploiting the retrospective view. 
You are using the pretext of machine self-reference as a wildcard. I could 
make up any sense modality...the sense of wisdotherm, for instance, and you 
would claim that that to not only exists but develops through machine 
self-reference.
 

>
>
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> We already know from synesthesia and from playing with peripherals for 
> electronic computers that this is not true. 
>
>
> Similar experiences have been done on salamander, and sinesthesia 
> illustrates my point, so that remark is a bit weird.
>

Synesthesia shows that data is not tied to any specific sense modality, so 
that were the purpose of sense merely to compress data input, there would 
be no plausible reason to have more than one sense modality.
 

>
>
> It would be like building a hard drive that cannot accept bytes that came 
> from a camera, only a microphone.
>
>
> That can easily be done.
>

But it would be pointless. You aren't seeing the futility of multiple sense 
modalities from a functional perspective. There is no function which cannot 
be expressed just as efficiently as a flavor as it could be as a digital 
code that has no flavor.
 

>
>
>  
>
>> Or you beg the question. keep in mind I don't argue for comp, but you are 
>> arguing against comp, so it is up to you to give some argument that testing 
>> a flavor cannot be a mathematical phenomenon.
>>
>
> The argument is that mathematical information is neither necessary nor 
> sufficient to generate an experience of flavor, color, etc. 
>
>
> That's not an argument. It is an assertion without argument.
>

The argument is that it is an assertion which is evidently true and has no 
counterfactual argument that is not evidently false.
 

>
>
>
> so there is no expectation that math has anything to do with it. Comp has 
> no more credence in explaining flavor than would geography.
>
>
> The understanding that flavor does provide is the opposite of math. It is 
> immediate 
>
>
> >Thanks to many cells doing a work learned through a very long time, may 
> be. It seems immediate, but the
>
>
> >evidences (brains) is that it is not.
>
> The evidence of the brain does not show that flavor exists, or worse, that 
> flavor could possibly exist. 
>
>
> The evidence exist, as there are evidence for self-reflexive loop in the 
> brain, and they can implement the self-reference which have been shown to 
> lead to qualia (defined semi-axiomatically).
>

What is the argument that something can 'lead to qualia', and why would 
self-reference acquire the power to generate qualia. This sentence refers 
to itself...does it have qualia now?
 

>
>
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> If the work that the cells do creates flavor, 
>
>
> The work does not have to create the qualia, only to make them relatively 
> manifestable. 
>

If they are manifesting them, what creates them?
 

> The work of the computer will reflected those non necessarily 
> representable feature, like the machine will distinguish its first and 
> third person description. Only God knows that they are equivalent ways of 
> seeing a part of the arithmetical truth, the machine will *feel* them as 
> very different. Unavoidably so.
>

Not unavoidably so. The machine doesn't need to feel anything, it only 
needs to make the location of arithmetical truth relatively manifestable. 
It can compute that a condition could be true, or that conditions about 
itself could be probable, or whatever in exactly the same way that a net 
*computes* that large fish stay on one side and small fish pass through.
 

>
>
> then the flavor would exist for them and not for us. 
>
>
> ? That is typical for flavors. I can "see" your flavor sensation.
>

Not at all. If you had no flavor sensation of your own to smuggle in to 
your analysis of my brain activity, you would never see anything resembling 
flavors, even if you studied it for 100 million years.
 

> I can see you biochemical path way, but the fact that we have comparable 
> complexity + the self-reference limitations explain why we can't associate 
> qualia to anything third person describable (not just machines, other 
> people's body too). 
>

I don't see that qualia could have anything to do with complexity or 
reference. Complexity and reference are themselves qualia. Qualia is 
absolutely simple, absolutely 'ferent' (not re-ferent). Qualia can refer to 
nothing except other qualia, when nested. Quanta is the qualia that refers 
to the nesting only. It is blind as a brick.
 

>
>
> We cannot make the attachment of physics a condition for qualia but not 
> for comp. 
>
>
> ?
>

You are running a double standard by requiring that qualia be considered as 
the inevitable product of a physical system, but you allow computation to 
not only be considered, but presumed to be independent of physics. 


>
> You assume disembodied, unexperienced math, but I do not. You assume 
> qualia contingent on math, but I assume the opposite.
>
>
> I show, with semi-axiomatic definition, the necessity of qualia, for all 
> machine whose complexity threshold is above universality.
>

Semi-axiomatic in this context means 'science-fiction' to me.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>
> (although develops briefly through time as well), it is irreducible to 
> anything other than flavor, and it does not consist of 'stepped reckoning' 
> of any kind, it is an aesthetic gestalt.
>
>
>> OK. No problem with this in the comp theory. That's the point of the 
> limitation theorems. Some truth can be accessible by machine, without them 
> having to do any hard work.
>
>
> But there is no reason to suspect that truth can include sensations.
>
>
> Of course there are reason to suspect truth can include sensations. The 
> true existence of sensations, for example.
>

That's begging the question. I am asserting that there is no ontological 
necessity for "truth" to include sensation of any kind. Just proving that 
something is true or that something has a way of discovering that a 
condition which we sense is true does not mean that the discovery is based 
in sensation/qualia. It's a huge and unwarranted leap.

 

> But there are no evidence that truth can include the existence of a 
> primitive physical reality which would need to be assumed.
>

The lack of evidence is identical. On what basis do you pull qualia out of 
the hat of truth but primitive physical reality is denied. That's racist! 
You are discriminating against my physon in law.
 

>
>
>
>
>
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>  
>
>> But you test it from the inside of math, and so it looks different from 
>> the math we learn at school. That it looks different is explainable by any 
>> Löbian machine,
>>
>
> Taste doesn't look like anything though, and it cannot ever look like 
> anything. If it did, then it would be vision. If it could be vision, then 
> it would be profoundly redundant to have both senses of the same 
> data...(assuming that Santa Claus has brought the possibility of senses to 
> begin with.)
>
> and can be understood intuitively with some training in the comp thought 
>> experiment. The difference are accounted by the intensional nuance of 
>> Gödel's provability. 
>>
>
> I don't think it is. It seems clear to me that any mechanical accounting 
> of sense implicitly takes sense for granted from the start. There is no 
> functional difference between sight, smell, feeling, hearing, etc. There is 
> no intensional nuance that ties to the possibility of any one of them - 
> only a grey box where something like virtual proof could theoretically live.
>
>
> I can relate to your feelings, but I don't see why a machine could not 
>> too. You just assert it, but you don't really provide an argument.
>>
>> You do point on a difficulty, but a difficulty is not an impossibility, 
>> especially that computer science already explains why machines will find 
>> that difficult too, for their own accessible truth spectrum.
>>
>
> The argument against comp is not one of impossibility, but of empirical 
> failure. 
>
>
> That is not an argument. You would have predicted that planes cannot fly,
>

Planes can't fly in any way that could have been predicted. Planes are shot 
through the air using forms and functions that allow their falling to be 
dynamically reduced. A plane cannot do what a bird or fly or mosquito does. 
It cannot nimbly feel its way through swirling convection currents. We call 
what planes do flying because our language is imprecise. You would have 
predicted that planes can't crash because they would feel the air like a 
bird.

 

> or that living being cannot fly, or that man cannot go to the moon. 
> Everything practical begins by empirical failure.
>

I think that Comp is that empirical failure. The entire approach will be 
like one of those early flying contraptions that look promising but never 
get very far off the ground.
 

>
>
> Sure, numbers could do this or that, but our experience does not support 
> that it has ever happened. 
>
>
> Because you don't listen to machines,
>

If Comp were true, then I could not listen to anything else but machines. 
Who are the machines who don't listen to machines?
 

> but you have warn us that even if they have the right behavior, you will 
> take them as zombies or puppets. So there is no hope to chnange your mind 
> on this.
>

I would change my mind if someone successfully uploaded themselves for a 
month into an artificial brain and then returned to their natural brain and 
had a convincing story to tell. Otherwise, no, I would not trade my clear 
and natural understanding of the nature of presentation and representation 
for what I can only see as the pathetic fallacy on steroids.
 

>
>
> In the mean time, the view that I suggest I think does make more sense and 
> supports our experience fully.
>
>
> I don't see that at all, except that you start from what we want explain.
>

Only because the notion of "explaining" that which is plain-ness itself is 
a non-starter.
 

> Organic molecules can associate to "create" thought, but not other 
> molecules. That makes everything more mysterious for me.
>

Organic molecules can create a lot of things that no other molecules can. 
Why would thought be any different? What would be the point of having 
different kinds of molecules? Why not just have different sequences of data?

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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