On 26 Oct 2013, at 11:24, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Saturday, October 26, 2013 3:30:11 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Oct 2013, at 19:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, October 25, 2013 10:11:04 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Oct 2013, at 18:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, October 24, 2013 10:16:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Oct 2013, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
"My problem is that you need
to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark."

Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math instead?

With comp, when you test the flavor of coffee, you do, actually, test the flavor of some math.

That's what I am saying. It would have to be the case under comp. My point though is that it is absurd. Tasting something gives us no mathematical understanding.

It does. It might teach you what math looks like from inside.

If that were true, then the same math could not be expressed as both a sound or an image, but we know that it can.

It depends which math. Some theories are categorical (defined completely the objects), and some are not and can corresponds to many realities.

What mathematical categories could correspond to a sound?

In the 3p, length waves + special information handling machine.
In the 1p, the non communicable/provable/rationally-believable part of some self-referential intensional logics.

For math to have an interior that looked like something, there would have to be some mathematical expression which only has an interior which is visible rather than auditory, olfactory, etc.

But I have shown that such math not only exist, but develop through machine self-reference.

Is that true though, or do you just want it to be true?

You have to study them and judge by yourself. It does not need to be true for my argument going on, though. I need only that you can't prove them false, without assuming non- comp.

I don't think that machine self-reference makes the development of any particular sense modality.

It leads to many modalities. That's a verifiable fact.

You're just exploiting the retrospective view. You are using the pretext of machine self-reference as a wildcard. I could make up any sense modality...the sense of wisdotherm, for instance, and you would claim that that to not only exists but develops through machine self-reference.

No argument here.

We already know from synesthesia and from playing with peripherals for electronic computers that this is not true.

Similar experiences have been done on salamander, and sinesthesia illustrates my point, so that remark is a bit weird.

Synesthesia shows that data is not tied to any specific sense modality,

In humans and machines.

so that were the purpose of sense merely to compress data input, there would be no plausible reason to have more than one sense modality.

So sense does not merely compress data.

It would be like building a hard drive that cannot accept bytes that came from a camera, only a microphone.

That can easily be done.

But it would be pointless. You aren't seeing the futility of multiple sense modalities from a functional perspective.

The many modalities which appears can all still differentiate in multi- sense.

There is no function which cannot be expressed just as efficiently as a flavor as it could be as a digital code that has no flavor.


Or you beg the question. keep in mind I don't argue for comp, but you are arguing against comp, so it is up to you to give some argument that testing a flavor cannot be a mathematical phenomenon.

The argument is that mathematical information is neither necessary nor sufficient to generate an experience of flavor, color, etc.

That's not an argument. It is an assertion without argument.

The argument is that it is an assertion which is evidently true and has no counterfactual argument that is not evidently false.

Apart from 1p, seen from 1p, nothing is obvious in public 3p theories, especially around the mind-body problem. We already know that for machines it is intuitively and directly obvious that they are not machine, and that betting on the "yes doctor" is not a simple task for them.

so there is no expectation that math has anything to do with it. Comp has no more credence in explaining flavor than would geography.

The understanding that flavor does provide is the opposite of math. It is immediate

>Thanks to many cells doing a work learned through a very long time, may be. It seems immediate, but the

>evidences (brains) is that it is not.

The evidence of the brain does not show that flavor exists, or worse, that flavor could possibly exist.

The evidence exist, as there are evidence for self-reflexive loop in the brain, and they can implement the self-reference which have been shown to lead to qualia (defined semi-axiomatically).

What is the argument that something can 'lead to qualia', and why would self-reference acquire the power to generate qualia. This sentence refers to itself...does it have qualia now?

No, because that sentence does not defined a universal machine, nor even a machine at all. But it is alrady enough rich to associate some qualia to reader of that sentences, but the qualia is in the mind's reader.

If the work that the cells do creates flavor,

The work does not have to create the qualia, only to make them relatively manifestable.

If they are manifesting them, what creates them?

The many true relations about numbers.

The work of the computer will reflected those non necessarily representable feature, like the machine will distinguish its first and third person description. Only God knows that they are equivalent ways of seeing a part of the arithmetical truth, the machine will *feel* them as very different. Unavoidably so.

Not unavoidably so. The machine doesn't need to feel anything,

It needs. I don't see how to avoid them, accepting semi-axiomatic (that you have already criticize, so this will not help you, but I am not sure anything can help you, as you have decide that even my sun-in- law is a puppet).

it only needs to make the location of arithmetical truth relatively manifestable. It can compute that a condition could be true, or that conditions about itself could be probable, or whatever in exactly the same way that a net *computes* that large fish stay on one side and small fish pass through.

then the flavor would exist for them and not for us.

? That is typical for flavors. I can "see" your flavor sensation.

Not at all. If you had no flavor sensation of your own to smuggle in to your analysis of my brain activity, you would never see anything resembling flavors, even if you studied it for 100 million years.

Right. I meant "I can't see your flavor sensation". It was a typo. You make my point.

I can see you biochemical path way, but the fact that we have comparable complexity + the self-reference limitations explain why we can't associate qualia to anything third person describable (not just machines, other people's body too).

I don't see that qualia could have anything to do with complexity or reference.

When you experience a qualia, there is a being refering to its sensation, or in relation with something happening to him/her.

Complexity and reference are themselves qualia.

No, there are not. You confuse complexity with some qualia humans can have when thinking about complexity. If complexity and references were qualia, there would be no qualia problem.

Qualia is absolutely simple, absolutely 'ferent' (not re-ferent).

From the 1p? Yes, that makes sense, to the machine.

Qualia can refer to nothing except other qualia, when nested. Quanta is the qualia that refers to the nesting only. It is blind as a brick.

We cannot make the attachment of physics a condition for qualia but not for comp.


You are running a double standard by requiring that qualia be considered as the inevitable product of a physical system, but you allow computation to not only be considered, but presumed to be independent of physics.

Qualia is an inevitable product of a person supported by arithmetical relations. I did not refer to physics.

You assume disembodied, unexperienced math, but I do not. You assume qualia contingent on math, but I assume the opposite.

I show, with semi-axiomatic definition, the necessity of qualia, for all machine whose complexity threshold is above universality.

Semi-axiomatic in this context means 'science-fiction' to me.

That might explain why you are slow on all this (despite your rather correct phenomenological accounts). Somehow, you refuse to study a 3p theory of the 1p, because you want the 1p escaping all theories, and you fail to see why, in the 3p sense, the 1p of the machine can be shown to already escape all theories.

(although develops briefly through time as well), it is irreducible to anything other than flavor, and it does not consist of 'stepped reckoning' of any kind, it is an aesthetic gestalt.

OK. No problem with this in the comp theory. That's the point of the limitation theorems. Some truth can be accessible by machine, without them having to do any hard work.

But there is no reason to suspect that truth can include sensations.

Of course there are reason to suspect truth can include sensations. The true existence of sensations, for example.

That's begging the question. I am asserting that there is no ontological necessity for "truth" to include sensation of any kind.

Of course, in general. But assuming comp, is no reason to doubt such elementary truth. The first step of UDA would not make sense if we were not believing in our consciousness, for example.

Just proving that something is true or that something has a way of discovering that a condition which we sense is true does not mean that the discovery is based in sensation/qualia. It's a huge and unwarranted leap.

Comp is a huge leap, that's right. I never hide this.On the contrary, I show that if we do that leap, then we need to come back to Plato, and to abandon physicalism, naturalism, etc.

Again, I am not defending that comp is true. I am just trying to explain that your saying that comp is false lacks argument.

But there are no evidence that truth can include the existence of a primitive physical reality which would need to be assumed.

The lack of evidence is identical. On what basis do you pull qualia out of the hat of truth

Because I work in the comp theory.

but primitive physical reality is denied. That's racist! You are discriminating against my physon in law.

Not at all. That would be the case if I said that physical reality does not exist. But pretending that it is not primitive does not introduce any zombie, no more than pretending there is no N ray, or no phlogiston, or no ether, ...

Sure, numbers could do this or that, but our experience does not support that it has ever happened.

Because you don't listen to machines,

If Comp were true, then I could not listen to anything else but machines.

That simply does not follow. It is not because machine can think that only machines can think.

Who are the machines who don't listen to machines?

You are an entity who does not listen to machines, (and if comp is true, you are a such a machine).

but you have warn us that even if they have the right behavior, you will take them as zombies or puppets. So there is no hope to chnange your mind on this.

I would change my mind if someone successfully uploaded themselves for a month into an artificial brain and then returned to their natural brain and had a convincing story to tell.

That would prove nothing. Comp is not provable, only refutable.

Otherwise, no, I would not trade my clear and natural understanding of the nature of presentation and representation for what I can only see as the pathetic fallacy on steroids.

In the mean time, the view that I suggest I think does make more sense and supports our experience fully.

I don't see that at all, except that you start from what we want explain.

Only because the notion of "explaining" that which is plain-ness itself is a non-starter.

Organic molecules can associate to "create" thought, but not other molecules. That makes everything more mysterious for me.

Organic molecules can create a lot of things that no other molecules can. Why would thought be any different? What would be the point of having different kinds of molecules? Why not just have different sequences of data?

Yes. Why? Indeed.



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