On 10/29/2013 8:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person indeterminacy like this (it requires some familiaraity with programming, but I will try to elaborate those details):

Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a virtual environment (an open field)
Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads:

    "At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will 
begin.  In
    the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in 
two), after
    the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent process 
and it
    will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a process into 
    identical copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A 
    after the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen.  This will 
happen 8
    times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end."

It is 11:59 in the simulation, what can the AI expect to see during the next 1 minute and 8 seconds?

I don't see that as any different. The problem is still what is the referent of "the AI". As John Clark points out "the AI" is ambiguous when there are duplicates. Sometimes Bruno talks about "the universal person" who is merely embodied as particular persons. So on that view it would be right to say *the* universal person sees Washington and Moscow. But then that's contrary to identifying a person by their memories. My view is that "a person" is just a useful model, when there is no duplication - and that's true whether the duplication is via Everett or Bruno's teleporter.


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