On 29 Oct 2013, at 22:12, LizR wrote:
I suggested doing this on FOAR (I used HAL from 2001). It simply
makes it easier to visualise if you forget about biological
creatures. Assuming comp, an AI is exactly equivalent to a human
person, so anything you can do to an AI could be done (in theory) to
a human by a teleporter, or to a human by MWI style splitting.
What should the AI expect to see? It should expect to see the ball
turn red and remain red. There are copies of it which see the ball
go blue at various points...
However this answer doesn't assume comp. According to comp it
doesn't know what "it" will see, or to be more exact it knows that
"it" will see all combinations, but by that time it will no longer
be an "it" but a "them". Technically - in this case - we know which
ones are the copies and which ones aren't - however comp says that
the AI will experience becoming many AIs, with varied experiences.
In any case, although one copy is the original, that doesn't really
help, because an AI, by its nature, is probably being constantly
swapped into different parts of computer memory (or stored on disc),
parts of it are being copied, other parts erased, and so on. Comp
says none of this matters - that its experiences are at a
fundamental level exactly like ours.
So. What's wrong with this picture, if anything?
I don't see anything wrong. Comp says mainly that you survive with a
simple teleportation, and so with a duplication (which is "two" simple
teleportations, independent). But this invokes the first person points
of view. Comp says two things, in fact:
1) that you survive in the 3p picture, or that your 3p-self survived,
in the sense that if someone want to meet you, he/she will succeed by
going either in W, or in M.
2) that you survive in the 1picture: not only the copies are not
zombies, but they are actually you, put simultaneously in two
different contexts. Those copies will look at which city they have
come to, and it all conceivable situations (with that protocol and
default hypotheses), they will write the name of only one city in the
diary. The difference between the diaries distinguish the first person
experience, and in this case, the statistics, if the duplication is
iterated, is (trivially) given by the binomial distribution.
It is the strict 3p determinism of a computation which guaranty the
statistical quality of the first person indeterminacy.
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