On 29 Oct 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/29/2013 8:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Chris,

Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person indeterminacy like this (it requires some familiaraity with programming, but I will try to elaborate those details):

Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a virtual environment (an open field) Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads: "At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will begin. In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen. This will happen 8 times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end." It is 11:59 in the simulation, what can the AI expect to see during the next 1 minute and 8 seconds?

I don't see that as any different. The problem is still what is the referent of "the AI". As John Clark points out "the AI" is ambiguous when there are duplicates.

But when you distinguish the 1p-you from the 3p-you, it is enough clarified for the reasoning to proceed.
(More precision leads to the 1004 fallacy)



Sometimes Bruno talks about "the universal person" who is merely embodied as particular persons. So on that view it would be right to say *the* universal person sees Washington and Moscom.

Yes. And once you believe that you are both in Washington and Moscow after the WM-duplication, it is not hard to derive that we are all person, or, equivalently, we are the universal person. But that (I think correct) view of identity, is of no use, and no role, in the understanding of the FPI and why physics emerges from the number, which concern output of simple experiment: like pushing on a button, and opening a door, and noting what you see. In fact what you say illustrates this well: personal identity is not used in the FPI: only results of experience noted in a diary (taken with in the boxes (1p), or not (3p)) is used.


But then that's contrary to identifying a person by their memories.

You need this only to make sense of the experience, and does not concern "who we really are". But when you do an experience of physics (any one), you have to take into account a local notion of (computational) continuity. the same when you say "yes" to a doctor, for any operation the doctor can do.



My view is that "a person" is just a useful model, when there is no duplication - and that's true whether the duplication is via Everett or Bruno's teleporter.

OK. I would distinguish person and personal identity. Person is not just a model, it is an important reality (as AUDA exemplifies in arithmetic). Person have to be respected in the measure of the possible. We can eat them, when they are animals, but we still do that with respect, and we might try to avoid unnecessary pain, which is not obvious given the culture, religion, etc.

Bruno





Brent

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