Hi,
I comment on Quentin, and then on John, to help anyone interested.
On 01 Nov 2013, at 22:22, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2013/11/1 John Clark <[email protected]>
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote
>> The diary is useless because the diary was written by "you" and
contains predictions about the further adventures of "you", but now
there are 2 (or more) people with the title "you" ...
> ..., but now there are 2 (or more) people IN THE THIRD PERSON POV,
And there are also 2 people IN THE FIRST PERSON POV and one of them
does not have a stronger claim to having a subjective existence than
the other.
> but the question concern the FIRST PERSON POV.
You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they
both remember writing the diary, so which one is
Bruno Marchal talking about?
Anyone of the two...
Exact.
each will have a different diary, and by repeating the experience
they will notice the frequency goes to 0.5, like when you do a coin
toss... oh but wait... JC does not want to look at that, oh wait...
JC said that probability is 0 or 1.... yes JC knows all.
Exact. The prediction, asked in Helsinki, concerned the 1-views, and
by comp we know that the 1-view is felt as unique, from the 1-view
point.
It looks like John Clark's Strategy consists in describing only the 3-
views. He is aware of the existence of the 1-view, and agreed that
they are unique---from their own 1-view, but keeps giving the 3-view
on the 1-views.
> And in Helsinki, you knew this in advance. You know that you will
survive
Yes, assuming that the pronoun "you" means what a fellow by the name
of Bruno Marchal says it means , namely " "you" concerns the
guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki".
John,
In most (all?) natural languages we use the same pronouns for the 1-
view, and the 3-view, and this for the probable reason that by
reproducing by sex, and by dying, we hide that we are all the same
amoeba, at least in the sense of the you in Washington is the same
person than the you in Moscow. We don't really recognize our children,
somehow.
here the 1-you's experience admits a very simple definition: it is the
story written in the diary that *you take with you, in Helsinki, in
the teleportation box.
Assuming you believe in comp, and assuming comp, you know that "1-you"
will "live" (write in the diary) a unique experience, and you are
asked to evaluate the chance of which one. You know intellectually
that the "1-you" will live all experience, but you know that they all
will live only one from their point of view, and so will have the
right to ask to themselves question like why am I the one with the
experience (described in the diary):
MMWWMWWMWWWWMMMMMM
Why this one? And how to evaluate if the next one is W or M? Oh! but
that's PI in binary, so it looks like my story is PI in binary (*), so
I can predict that the next experience will be W! Is that rational
with respect to comp? The fact is that the prediction will be refuted
by one of the continuation, and we have already agree that they are
both consistent extension with the right to identify themselves with
the person before duplication, and so we have to listen to BOTH of them.
In the worlds of the iterated self-duplication, prediction like PI,
"always W", are confirmed by a set of experience which get measure 0
among all (infinite) experiences.
Fortunately, if in the arithmetical reality there is some amount of
randomness, there is much more structure than that, and with comp, the
points of view (always self-referential with respect to some universal
number(s)), get structured by the logics of self-reference (the
infinity of them).
(*) pi, in binary, is
11.001001000011111101101010100010001000010110100011...
> and experience being in only one place.
No, assuming that the pronoun "you" means what a fellow by the name
of Bruno Marchal says it means , namely " "you" concerns the guy(s)
who will remember having been in Helsinki". And now ladies and
gentleman let the backpedaling begin! If we backpedal hard enough
soon we will leave the kingdom of the true but trivial and enter the
land of gibberish.
>> and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to.
> False. It is very easy. In both city the diary is the one [you]
have with where [you] have found to be,
^
^^ ^^^
There we go again with that damn weasel pronoun! But it won't get
Bruno Marchal off the hook this time, Bruno Marchal stated what it
means, " "you" concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in
Helsinki", therefore the fellow named "you" has found himself to be
in BOTH Washington and Moscow.
> and it is the diary containing the prediction written in Helsinki.
And it was written by "you" and "you" now resides in Washington AND
Moscow.
> You continue to ignore that the question concerns the 1-you, as
seen by [the 1-you] , and not any 3-view of the
situation
. ^
^^^^^^^^
In the thought experiment there is no "the 1-you" there is only "a 1-
you" because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED! That's what it means to be
duplicated!
There is "a 1-you" in the 3-1 view. But in the "1-1-view" (= 1-view)
after the duplication, you know very well who you are. You opened the
door, and see W, and not M. Or M, and not W. So there is a "the 1-
you", indeed, in the 3-view, there are two such "the 1-you", who each
know very well the one I mean when I tell him "you".
You avoid putting your foot in the mind of the survivors of such
experience.
You are the one exploiting the ambiguity of the pronouns, which exists
in the natural languages, to avoid the use of a simple but important
nuance (made describable by the use of diaries in pure 3p terms)
between two different use of the pronouns.
And you are singularly misinformed, as, in case you want to avoid the
thought experience, I translated the 1 and 3 views in existing, by
incompleteness, nuances of the Gödelian or Löbian standard notion for
self-reference, and this by applying the oldest definition of
knowledge to that Gödelian precise notion of rational believability.
For example, the fact that the 1-1-view is equivalent with the 1-view,
is translated in arithmetic by the fact that for all (sigma_1 or not)
arithmetical propositions x, [][]x <-> []x is true, with []x = Bx & x.
(and thus [][]p is [](Bx & x) = B(Bx & x) & (Bx & x) ). And the
machine knows that equivalence.
Your confusion between 3-1 views with 1-views becomes, in arithmetic,
a confusion between the arithmetical sentences: B[]x and [][]x. They
are equivalent, for each p, actually, but the correct machine cannot
know that. The equivalence is provable in G*; but not in G, unlike []x
<-> [][]x.
Everything I say in UDA is translated in arithmetical term in AUDA, so
that they are theorems, or conjectures, in any first order logical
specification of any universal system ( number, combinator, GOL-
pattern, etc.)
I think I see how you try to avoid step 3 (by considering 3-1 views,
instead of the 1-views on which the initial question was bearing).
I am interested if you have a critic, or heard a critic on AUDA, the
"interview of he machine", or the "Arithmetical version of the UDA".
AUDA is more math demanding (needs mathematical logic), and you can
always criticize the definitions, but the definitions are not mine,
and are rather standard.
With UDA, I try to help you to understand something.
In AUDA, I explain that (sound) Löbian machines already understand
that, in some (precise) sense.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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