On 16 Nov 2013, at 04:51, Samiya Illias wrote:

Neils Bohr is famously quoted as saying: 'Everything we call real is made of things that cannot be regarded asreal.

He said something close to that in some of his talk on complementarity.
It is a bit of a non-sense, easy to derive from the "wave packet reduction postulate", which is also quite non sensical. Bohr and the "Copenhagians" are forced to bet on some dualism, with the observer no more obeying quantum mechanics.

That is basically the measurement problem, and that is solved when we decide to apply the SWE on both the observer and the observed, without collapse of the wave. Of course this leads to the many-world "interpretation of QM", which Bohr rejected. He even refused to talk with Everett.

Mermin said similar "nonsense". Like when he said that "Now we know definitely that when we don't look at the moon, it does not exist".

If quantum mechanics hasn't profoundly shocked you, you haven't understood it yet.”

I remember that quote, and Feynman said something similar, if I remember well.

What's your take on this?

The many world gives physical reality back at all scale. But it uses computationalism or some weakening of it, which makes the physical reality emerging from the number's relations, (what I explain in this list---see my URL for more on this), so particles and waves are unreal stuff, but remains or should remain (or comp is false) persistent information pattern.

So, "real" has different meaning, according to the points of view we can have when we look at things. Atoms and physical objects are "real" persistent relative information pattern, but unreal if considered as primitive stuff some world would be made of.

With computationalism (i.e. the idea that the mind obeys computable laws), the picture is given by an ontological number (or equivalent) reality. This entails the existence of all computations, from which emerge the physical reality (by the first person indeterminacy on all computations). Note that if "we" obeys mechanical laws, the physical reality does no more obey only to computable laws, nor does the epistemology. If I am a machine, everything-else is, globally, not a machine. Indeed, we can't predict of compute the FPI, nor the Quantum indeterminacy. With computationalism, we know why.



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