On 16 Nov 2013, at 04:51, Samiya Illias wrote:
Neils Bohr is famously quoted as saying: 'Everything we call real is
made of things that cannot be regarded asreal.
He said something close to that in some of his talk on complementarity.
It is a bit of a non-sense, easy to derive from the "wave packet
reduction postulate", which is also quite non sensical.
Bohr and the "Copenhagians" are forced to bet on some dualism, with
the observer no more obeying quantum mechanics.
That is basically the measurement problem, and that is solved when we
decide to apply the SWE on both the observer and the observed, without
collapse of the wave. Of course this leads to the many-world
"interpretation of QM", which Bohr rejected. He even refused to talk
Mermin said similar "nonsense". Like when he said that "Now we know
definitely that when we don't look at the moon, it does not exist".
If quantum mechanics hasn't profoundly shocked you, you haven't
understood it yet.”
I remember that quote, and Feynman said something similar, if I
What's your take on this?
The many world gives physical reality back at all scale. But it uses
computationalism or some weakening of it, which makes the physical
reality emerging from the number's relations, (what I explain in this
list---see my URL for more on this), so particles and waves are unreal
stuff, but remains or should remain (or comp is false) persistent
So, "real" has different meaning, according to the points of view we
can have when we look at things. Atoms and physical objects are "real"
persistent relative information pattern, but unreal if considered as
primitive stuff some world would be made of.
With computationalism (i.e. the idea that the mind obeys computable
laws), the picture is given by an ontological number (or equivalent)
reality. This entails the existence of all computations, from which
emerge the physical reality (by the first person indeterminacy on all
computations). Note that if "we" obeys mechanical laws, the physical
reality does no more obey only to computable laws, nor does the
epistemology. If I am a machine, everything-else is, globally, not a
machine. Indeed, we can't predict of compute the FPI, nor the Quantum
indeterminacy. With computationalism, we know why.
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