On 16 Nov 2013, at 15:14, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

That particle interactions can be reduced to math and math to set theory or peano aritmethic or category theory or homotophy type theory resembles me the idea that persons can be reduced to elementary particles, so persons are uninteresting objects.


You get it wrong. You really need to study the argument. I assume that my "body" is a machine, and this entails that the laws of physics have to emerge from "arithmetic seen by itself from some angle" (to be short).

Contrarily of what you say, incompleteness makes Theaetetus' definition of knower (person) unavoidable by the machines themselves (the universal numbers themselves), and it makes it playing a fundamental rôle in the relative emergence of "physical realities".

Computationalism does not reduce the persons to numbers, only its many bodies. Like the arithmetical truth itself cannot be reduce to a number.

Comp does not lead to a reductionist conception of the person, nor does it reduce matter to one computation.

In fact, by the mechanisability of the diagonal argument, and the fact that machine's can prove and become 'aware' of their own limitations, in some constructive way, comp becomes a vaccine against a large class of possible reductionism. The löbian machines already know that it has a soul and that such a soul, if it is a machine, cannot appears or be defined by any machine, including herself.

What you have are three undefinable realm with "====>" is a form of logical entailment

ARITHMETICAL TRUTH ===> THEOLOGICAL TRUTH ===> PHYSICAL TRUTH

Comp leads to a conception of reality where the physical is the border of the theological "mental, spiritual, arithmetical" reality. It is what you get when you take seriously the global FPI (First Person Indeterminacy) of the universal numbers reatively to all universal histories.

Not only it does not say that person are not important, comp attributes personhood where the people with "magic" theory of mind don't attribute.

From this an arithmetical quantization appears where to be expected, and obeys up to now a quantum logic, and the derivation of physics is "only" a (diffcult) mathematical exercise. This makes comp+theaetetus refutable.


And because I think that knowledge is something primarily and foremost for helping to live our lifes, I consider this the worst error of the last centuries.


I agree with you, and show that computer science makes you right even for numbers and machines, above the "universal" level of complexity threshold.

For comp the notion of person is fundamental (but not primitive!).

Bruno






2013/11/16 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

On 16 Nov 2013, at 11:32, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sat, Nov 16, 2013 at 5:22 AM, Samiya Illias <samiyaill...@gmail.com> wrote: Never mind who said it. Considering what we know of quantum mechanics, is everything real made of everything unreal? Does that mean that everything is actually unreal, a holograph, a reflection of our mind, if that is real?

As Bruno said, "real" is not properly defined. If you interview some
random person on the street, you are likely to get something like
real=material. Under that definition, I think most of us would agree
with the quote. But this is a naive and uninteresting definition of
real.

I have a friend who's a psychiatrist and likes the definition: "real
is what does not go away when you stop believing it". He likes it
because it's useful to him, because it helps with therapy in many
cases. I think this definition will also run into problems with comp.
It already runs into problems even with Plato and his cave. But he has
it easy, because his job is just to guide people into a state of
consciousness where they can hopefully have a life with less
suffering. Of course, the buddhists might argue that he's not doing it
right :)

I think Bruno might agree with this: 2 + 2 + 4 is real.

Yes, 2+2+4 is real, and 2+2=4 is true.

If the base theory is arithmetic, 2+2+4 is the same object as s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))))))). If we use the combinators instead, 2+2+4 would be the name of some complex combinators, and would seem less primitive and more like a derived element, making the objective reality a bit of a convention, almost. What counts are the illusions from inside. They don't depend on the choice of the absic reality. In a sense, with comp, the illusions and dreams are more real that the stuff we imagine, which are useful fictions.

Bruno







On Sat, Nov 16, 2013 at 9:11 AM, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@gmail.com> wrote:

I suspect this is one of those fake quotes that gets circulated around the
internet; searching for "everything we call real" and "bohr" on
books.google.com I mostly just find it in various religious/ spiritual books,
nothing scholarly (and nothing dating back to before 1986).

Jesse


On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:51 PM, Samiya Illias <samiyaill...@gmail.com >
wrote:

Neils Bohr is famously quoted as saying: 'Everything we call real is made
of things that cannot be regarded asreal. If quantum mechanics hasn't
profoundly shocked you, you haven't understood it yet.”
What's your take on this?

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