On 30 Nov 2013, at 12:53, Roger Clough wrote:

Why consciousness is not possible in materialism

Two related definitions of consciousness are:

1. Consciousness is experience by the first person singular.

2. Consciousness is self-referential awareness.

So consciousness requires that there be a self,
or first person singular, to be aware.

There is however no provision in materialism
or analytic philoophy for such a self.

This is not correct. Computer have self (or can get them easily), and a computer can be material a priori.

The self is a structure control, and can be implemented materially, like any control structure.

The trick has been explained very often in this list (cf Dx = "xx" => DD = "DD").




Therefore materialism cannot explain consciousness.

That is correct, but for deeper reason than your incorrect argument above.

In fact, materialism cannot explain matter, either. Worst, it avoids trying to explain it at the start.

Bruno






Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough


        
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