On 02 Dec 2013, at 23:00, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/2/2013 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I don't think it's so simple as applying Occam's razor. In my example "red" is an experience that from the perspective of conscious thoughts may have no explanation, i.e. is fundamental.

Like the guy in Washington cannot explain why he is the one in Washington. But we can explain why he cannot explain it, and in general we can explain why machines are first person confronted with arithmetical first person truth that they have to feel as fundamental and unexplainable.




But from the perspective of biology has an explanation in terms of physics and chemistry. From an evolutionary perspective it has an explanation in terms of survival advantage. So Occam's razor cuts different ways depending on the perspective.

This is an abstract "base problem", but with comp the points of view don't depend on the choice of base machine, and we can refine the use of Occam razor for each points of view. In fact we can use it only one time, for the Turing universal ontology.


They don't depend on the choice of base machine because you've chosen Turing computation as fundamental.

I use Church thesis, and the hope/fear to survive a digital substitution at some level.


That doesn't show that something else could not have been chosen as fundamental instead.

Or that something has to give some helps to the universal persons distributed in the arithmetical reality. The Aristotelian God Matter fails in Comp, so let us look at the God of Plato, being quite open minded, because we are at the (eternal) beginning (of the machine's interview). The universal machine is not God (which is Truth), but it has an inner God which is the part agreeing with God (Truth). It is the first person experience. It allows experiences and knowledge states, deception too.

Bruno





Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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