On 11 Dec 2013, at 21:35, John Mikes wrote:
Yes - to the doctor? I was always kept aback from agreeing, because
I still believe to have included M O R E in my mind
(brainfunctions, as you say) then whatever that good doctor and his
device may supply.
You have to assumed that there are some actual infinities playing a
role in your ... brain. That would be assuming non-comp, and going out
of the theory I am working in (false or true, we cannot really be sure).
So I consider a mechanical substitution to the 'living' (what is
it?) capabilities a reduction in qualia and quanta.
OK. But again, that is like to say that you are open to non-comp. Me
too, but "professionally "I work in comp.
Unless "the doctor" is an infinite universal machine...(still to
have to meet one...)
All machine are finite. All universal machine are finite.
There are notions of universality for some non-machine notion, but
they are not machine.
If something is actually infinite, it is not a machine. Church thesis
allows us to identify machine with natural numbers, and reciprocally,
if we want to do that (in some context, it eases the proofs without
changing the generality).
Bruno
JM
On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:10 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 12/11/2013 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:
Hi List
I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you
might be interested in this article from the Science Daily on line
magazine
Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury
Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,
Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat.
Even if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the
human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to
much on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.
But this brings up a difficulty I see in "comp". We know that if
the level of substitution is quantal, then we can't clone the
state of the part being replaced (and in the UD model this
corresponds to not knowing all the threads of computation through
the state). This wouldn't deter people from saying "yes" to the
doctor. But it implies that there will the a qualitative difference
in consciousness, a "jump", perhaps like a memory gap and temporary
disorientation due to concussion or drugs. But then why doesn't
some improbable quantum fluctuation prevent the part replacement and
provide a more continuous path of consciousness, in analogy to
quantum immortality?
Brent
To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal
long ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology
confirms the use of comp by biological system all the time.
Bruno
George Levy
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