Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically likely]

Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication possible? I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same question. On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without > thinking to much > on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival. > > Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the "no-cloning" > theorem. > > > The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem without assuming > physics. > > > > > I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumvents that > theorem. > But do not understand your argument. > It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertainty principle. > Could you discuss this? > > > The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how far you go > in the UD-Argument. > If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all we need to > assume is a (classical, quantum, whatever) universal formalism/theory, and > I use the numbers+add+mult to fix the thing. > > Then you know that in that universal formalism, notably in the > arithmetical reality, we can prove the existence of an infinity of > computations (or of finite piece of computations: the first person will not > see the difference) going through your state, defined by some substitution > level. Below the level, and thus in the "apparent matter", there will be an > infinity of computations needed to describe exactly that matter (the global > FPI domain in arithmetic). This makes a priori the apparent primitive > matter non-clonable. The primitive matter is literally a statistical sum on > infinity of histories/computations, and you need the entire running of the > UD to define it (to get the global FPI). It is not something a priori > duplicable. > > So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, > consequence of the comp hypothesis. QM confirms this (which *proves* > nothing, to be sure). > > If our (sharable) level of substitution is exactly the quantum level (that > is for example the position and impulsion of our particles at the > Heisenberg uncertainty level, or just above) then quantum mechanics will be > exactly derivable from comp. If our substitution level is below the > Heisenberg uncertainty level, (we would have a quantum brain/computer) then > things are more complex. As the UD emulates also all quantum computations, > the reversal physics/arithmetic is still obtained, but QM could no more be > the fundamental theory in physics, and might appear as an approximation of > an unknown theory (something like a non-linear QM). I doubt this from the > evidences both from introspection, biology and physics. If our subst level > is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable from > arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus variable in > the whole of the physical reality). > > We can come back on this. Better to be completely convinced by the UDA > before, as it gives the frame in which address your difficult question. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > Richard > > > > > On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote: >> >> Hi List >> >> I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you might be >> interested in this article from the Science >> Daily<http://www.sciencedaily.com/>on line magazine >> >> Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain >> Injury<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/12/131209152259.htm> >> >> >> Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best, >> Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat. Even if >> the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the human will say >> "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to much on the theoretical >> consequences of the possible survival. >> >> To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal long >> ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the use of comp >> by biological system all the time. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> George Levy >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.