Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically likely]
Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication possible? I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same question. On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without > thinking to much > on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival. > > Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the "no-cloning" > theorem. > > > The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem without assuming > physics. > > > > > I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumvents that > theorem. > But do not understand your argument. > It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertainty principle. > Could you discuss this? > > > The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how far you go > in the UD-Argument. > If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all we need to > assume is a (classical, quantum, whatever) universal formalism/theory, and > I use the numbers+add+mult to fix the thing. > > Then you know that in that universal formalism, notably in the > arithmetical reality, we can prove the existence of an infinity of > computations (or of finite piece of computations: the first person will not > see the difference) going through your state, defined by some substitution > level. Below the level, and thus in the "apparent matter", there will be an > infinity of computations needed to describe exactly that matter (the global > FPI domain in arithmetic). This makes a priori the apparent primitive > matter non-clonable. The primitive matter is literally a statistical sum on > infinity of histories/computations, and you need the entire running of the > UD to define it (to get the global FPI). It is not something a priori > duplicable. > > So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, > consequence of the comp hypothesis. QM confirms this (which *proves* > nothing, to be sure). > > If our (sharable) level of substitution is exactly the quantum level (that > is for example the position and impulsion of our particles at the > Heisenberg uncertainty level, or just above) then quantum mechanics will be > exactly derivable from comp. If our substitution level is below the > Heisenberg uncertainty level, (we would have a quantum brain/computer) then > things are more complex. As the UD emulates also all quantum computations, > the reversal physics/arithmetic is still obtained, but QM could no more be > the fundamental theory in physics, and might appear as an approximation of > an unknown theory (something like a non-linear QM). I doubt this from the > evidences both from introspection, biology and physics. If our subst level > is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable from > arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus variable in > the whole of the physical reality). > > We can come back on this. Better to be completely convinced by the UDA > before, as it gives the frame in which address your difficult question. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > Richard > > > > > On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote: >> >> Hi List >> >> I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you might be >> interested in this article from the Science >> Daily<http://www.sciencedaily.com/>on line magazine >> >> Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain >> Injury<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/12/131209152259.htm> >> >> >> Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best, >> Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat. Even if >> the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the human will say >> "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to much on the theoretical >> consequences of the possible survival. >> >> To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal long >> ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the use of comp >> by biological system all the time. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> George Levy >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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