On 11 Dec 2013, at 22:18, LizR wrote:
ISTM that "Yes Doctor" sums up comp. If a digital brain made below
my substitution level can substitute for my organic one, then I
literally have a 50% chance of waking up as the digital version.
However if the Subst Level is quantum, no cloning stops it being
actually possible.
OK. But that does not prevent the UD to "prepare" infinitely often
your unknown quantum states, and the reversal consequence will still
apply. We still got step 7, and the six first steps can still be done,
although they cill lost the pedagogical easiness.
Although in this case the universe itself is happy to do it all the
time, "forking" everything continually; maybe one could use the MWI
to design a suitable - if slightly less elegant - thought experiment
(e.g. Helsinki man goes into a sealed room where hs is rendered
unconscious, then according to a quantum result, he is taken to
either Moscow or Washington...)
But then when we derive the QM from arithmetic, people will claims
that we have used the quantum at the start.
you are logically correct, but using the quantum might confuse the
people in the conclusions. I think. It is simpler to reason in the
simple classical case, and to correct the conclusions with respect of
the depth of the level after. IMO.
Bruno
On 12 December 2013 09:35, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
Yes - to the doctor? I was always kept aback from agreeing, because
I still believe to have included M O R E in my mind
(brainfunctions, as you say) then whatever that good doctor and his
device may supply. So I consider a mechanical substitution to the
'living' (what is it?) capabilities a reduction in qualia and
quanta. Unless "the doctor" is an infinite universal machine...
(still to have to meet one...)
JM
On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:10 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 12/11/2013 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:
Hi List
I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you
might be interested in this article from the Science Daily on line
magazine
Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury
Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,
Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat.
Even if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the
human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to
much on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.
But this brings up a difficulty I see in "comp". We know that if
the level of substitution is quantal, then we can't clone the state
of the part being replaced (and in the UD model this corresponds to
not knowing all the threads of computation through the state). This
wouldn't deter people from saying "yes" to the doctor. But it
implies that there will the a qualitative difference in
consciousness, a "jump", perhaps like a memory gap and temporary
disorientation due to concussion or drugs. But then why doesn't
some improbable quantum fluctuation prevent the part replacement and
provide a more continuous path of consciousness, in analogy to
quantum immortality?
Brent
To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal
long ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the
use of comp by biological system all the time.
Bruno
George Levy
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