On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 3:10 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

>  On 12/12/2013 12:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Dec 12, 2013, at 11:00 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>   On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>  Liz,
>>
>>  In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on
>> various quantum states.
>> Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from
>> your previous state.
>> If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
>> since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
>> Rich
>>
>>  Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital
> consciousness involves constant state changes, at the substitution level
> and below. You end up with something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred
> Hoyle's pigeon holes, or someone, not sure who's "capsule" model of
> identity. It's all very Heraclitean!
>
>
> Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots".  The
> computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and time
> and one "thought" overlaps another.
>
>
>  That isn't obvious to me. Are you saying the brain manufactures 10^43
> thoughts per second?  Would we know if the brain only made ~30 thoughts per
> second?
>
>
> No, I'm saying, roughly, the latter.  And those thoughts have extension in
> both space and time (in the brain) as physically realized, so they can
> overlap.  The overlapping times them together and provides an ordering,
> corresponding to the experience of consciousness and time.
>
>
Okay.  I agree with this.  It is particularly evident in the case of a
single-threaded CPU emulating a neural network, which is maximally spread
out in time (rather than space), but implements the same computation and
same consciousness.

Jason

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