On 12/12/2013 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 13 December 2013 06:00, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:
On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Liz,
In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on
various
quantum states.
Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from
your
previous state.
If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
Rich
Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital consciousness
involves
constant state changes, at the substitution level and below. You end up with
something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred Hoyle's pigeon holes, or
someone,
not sure who's "capsule" model of identity. It's all very Heraclitean!
Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots". The
computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and time
and one
"thought" overlaps another.
Sorry, but I don't quite see what you mean here. How does being distributed in space and
time avoid snapshots? You can still split space-time into snapshots in the MWI (or
"foliate" space-time in relativity, I guess) in a manner that usefully explains extended
processes - they just extend across sequential snapshots / foliations. Digital
consciousness would presumably have a clock at some level, and steps, but that might be
far above the level of MWI snapshots, or it might be far below it - space-time itself
might be digital, which would automatically allow higher level processes to be (in the
sense required for comp).
Are you just saying that "observer moments" can't be identified with "MWI
snapshots" ?
Yes, but not JUST that. Foliation of spacetime is not unique. So no matter how slice it,
a computational state that is extended in space and time can't be captured on a slice.
It's on multiple slices and so it can overlap with other computational states and this
implies an inherent order. Of course this wouldn't apply if spacetime is itself discrete,
but assuming that would be at a much finer level than computational states then the
spacetime relations would supply continuity to the computational states.
And it seems experimentally that spacetime is not discrete even below the
Planck length.
Brent
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