On 13 December 2013 13:07, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 12/12/2013 2:52 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 13 December 2013 06:00, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Liz, >>> >>> In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on >>> various quantum states. >>> Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from >>> your previous state. >>> If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same >>> since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor. >>> Rich >>> >>> Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital >> consciousness involves constant state changes, at the substitution level >> and below. You end up with something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred >> Hoyle's pigeon holes, or someone, not sure who's "capsule" model of >> identity. It's all very Heraclitean! >> >> >> Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots". >> The computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and >> time and one "thought" overlaps another. >> >> Sorry, but I don't quite see what you mean here. How does being > distributed in space and time avoid snapshots? You can still split > space-time into snapshots in the MWI (or "foliate" space-time in > relativity, I guess) in a manner that usefully explains extended processes > - they just extend across sequential snapshots / foliations. Digital > consciousness would presumably have a clock at some level, and steps, but > that might be far above the level of MWI snapshots, or it might be far > below it - space-time itself might be digital, which would automatically > allow higher level processes to be (in the sense required for comp). > > Are you just saying that "observer moments" can't be identified with > "MWI snapshots" ? > > > Yes, but not JUST that. Foliation of spacetime is not unique. So no > matter how slice it, a computational state that is extended in space and > time can't be captured on a slice. It's on multiple slices and so it can > overlap with other computational states and this implies an inherent > order. Of course this wouldn't apply if spacetime is itself discrete, but > assuming that would be at a much finer level than computational states then > the spacetime relations would supply continuity to the computational states. >
That's all true, and QM and SR have been known to disagree on this for a long time, I believe. I doubt that anyone would try to identify observer moments with snapshots or foliations (especially if they're generated in arithmetic, of course) > > And it seems experimentally that spacetime is not discrete even below the > Planck length. > I'd like to know how watertight that result is. IIRC they were looking for a particular type of granularity - was it to do with the holographic principle? I believe it rules out some theories (LQG?) which assume space-time is granular (in a particular sense...) ? I would like to know more about this. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.