On 13 December 2013 13:07, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 12/12/2013 2:52 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 13 December 2013 06:00, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Liz, >>> >>> In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on >>> various quantum states. >>> Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from >>> your previous state. >>> If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same >>> since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor. >>> Rich >>> >>> Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital >> consciousness involves constant state changes, at the substitution level >> and below. You end up with something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred >> Hoyle's pigeon holes, or someone, not sure who's "capsule" model of >> identity. It's all very Heraclitean! >> >> >> Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots". >> The computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and >> time and one "thought" overlaps another. >> >> Sorry, but I don't quite see what you mean here. How does being > distributed in space and time avoid snapshots? You can still split > space-time into snapshots in the MWI (or "foliate" space-time in > relativity, I guess) in a manner that usefully explains extended processes > - they just extend across sequential snapshots / foliations. Digital > consciousness would presumably have a clock at some level, and steps, but > that might be far above the level of MWI snapshots, or it might be far > below it - space-time itself might be digital, which would automatically > allow higher level processes to be (in the sense required for comp). > > Are you just saying that "observer moments" can't be identified with > "MWI snapshots" ? > > > Yes, but not JUST that. Foliation of spacetime is not unique. So no > matter how slice it, a computational state that is extended in space and > time can't be captured on a slice. It's on multiple slices and so it can > overlap with other computational states and this implies an inherent > order. Of course this wouldn't apply if spacetime is itself discrete, but > assuming that would be at a much finer level than computational states then > the spacetime relations would supply continuity to the computational states. >
That's all true, and QM and SR have been known to disagree on this for a long time, I believe. I doubt that anyone would try to identify observer moments with snapshots or foliations (especially if they're generated in arithmetic, of course) > > And it seems experimentally that spacetime is not discrete even below the > Planck length. > I'd like to know how watertight that result is. IIRC they were looking for a particular type of granularity - was it to do with the holographic principle? I believe it rules out some theories (LQG?) which assume space-time is granular (in a particular sense...) ? I would like to know more about this. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
