On 12/12/2013 4:18 PM, LizR wrote:
On 13 December 2013 13:07, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
On 12/12/2013 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 13 December 2013 06:00, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:
On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Liz,
In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends
on
various quantum states.
Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change
from your
previous state.
If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
Rich
Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital
consciousness
involves constant state changes, at the substitution level and below.
You end
up with something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred Hoyle's pigeon
holes,
or someone, not sure who's "capsule" model of identity. It's all very
Heraclitean!
Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots". The
computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and
time and
one "thought" overlaps another.
Sorry, but I don't quite see what you mean here. How does being distributed
in
space and time avoid snapshots? You can still split space-time into
snapshots in
the MWI (or "foliate" space-time in relativity, I guess) in a manner that
usefully
explains extended processes - they just extend across sequential snapshots /
foliations. Digital consciousness would presumably have a clock at some
level, and
steps, but that might be far above the level of MWI snapshots, or it might
be far
below it - space-time itself might be digital, which would automatically
allow
higher level processes to be (in the sense required for comp).
Are you just saying that "observer moments" can't be identified with "MWI
snapshots" ?
Yes, but not JUST that. Foliation of spacetime is not unique. So no matter
how
slice it, a computational state that is extended in space and time can't be
captured
on a slice. It's on multiple slices and so it can overlap with other
computational
states and this implies an inherent order. Of course this wouldn't apply if
spacetime is itself discrete, but assuming that would be at a much finer
level than
computational states then the spacetime relations would supply continuity
to the
computational states.
That's all true, and QM and SR have been known to disagree on this for a long time, I
believe. I doubt that anyone would try to identify observer moments with snapshots or
foliations (especially if they're generated in arithmetic, of course)
And it seems experimentally that spacetime is not discrete even below the
Planck length.
I'd like to know how watertight that result is. IIRC they were looking for a particular
type of granularity - was it to do with the holographic principle?
The result was lack of frequency dispersion for gamma rays. So it was assuming some
interaction between photons and the discrete units of spacetime. That seems pretty tight.
Brent
I believe it rules out some theories (LQG?) which assume space-time is granular (in a
particular sense...) ? I would like to know more about this.
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