On 12 Dec 2013, at 23:58, LizR wrote:
On 13 December 2013 10:27, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use
the personal pronoun "you", it's the only other fellow in the room
with me; but in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing
to the right of the duplicating machine and a identical looking man
standing to the left of the duplicating machine and they both have a
equal right to use the grand title "you".
> But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way,
No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines; and by
insisting that they do you're assuming the most important part of
the very thing you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know if he's
the copy or the original. Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old
or 40 seconds old. Mr. You does know that he's the guy who is having
this thought right now, but in a worjd of duplicating machines that
is insufficient information to make a differentiation because that
fellow over there (or is it a mirror) could be having the exact same
thought at the exact same time.
But I do know who I am in the first person, regardless of my
personal history, and regardless of the existence of duplicating
machines.
Right. In fact, even after the duplication and reconstitution, and
before looking at which city, both copies know who they are in the 1p.
They just don't know yet where there are. And I see that this is what
you say below, and the mention of Dennett "where I am" is quite apt.
John is just ridiculous on this. His point is close to sheer nonsense.
Eventually he illustrates how big the hand waving need to be to avoid
the comp consequence.
I still don't know if he want save primitive matter, or if it is only
a personal psychological or social problem.
We could make further extensions to the above scenario - say I'm
really a digital copy, stored in a computer in Daniel Dennett's
secret laboratory, but linked to the senses of an android which
seems to be human - it appears human when it looks at itself in the
mirror, etc. As far as I can tell I am that android, and unless it
strays so far from my computer that there are appreciable delays in
communication, or its batteries run out or something, I will never
know otherwise. But even so, I am still correct about who I am.
Exactly.
I think you're mixing up my first person knowledge of who am I with
the third person knowledge required to know about the history of my
body.
Indeed.
Bruno
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