On 13 December 2013 10:27, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use the >>> personal pronoun "you", it's the only other fellow in the room with me; but >>> in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of the >>> duplicating machine and a identical looking man standing to the left of the >>> duplicating machine and they both have a equal right to use the grand title >>> "you". >>> >> >> > > But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way, >> > > No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines; and by insisting > that they do you're assuming the most important part of the very thing > you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know if he's the copy or the > original. Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old or 40 seconds old. Mr. > You does know that he's the guy who is having this thought right now, but > in a worjd of duplicating machines that is insufficient information to make > a differentiation because that fellow over there (or is it a mirror) could > be having the exact same thought at the exact same time. >
But I *do *know who I am in the first person, regardless of my personal history, and regardless of the existence of duplicating machines. We could make further extensions to the above scenario - say I'm really a digital copy, stored in a computer in Daniel Dennett's secret laboratory, but linked to the senses of an android which seems to be human - it appears human when it looks at itself in the mirror, etc. As far as I can tell I am that android, and unless it strays so far from my computer that there are appreciable delays in communication, or its batteries run out or something, I will never know otherwise. But even so, I am still correct about who I am. I think you're mixing up my first person knowledge of who am I with the third person knowledge required to know about the history of my body. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
