On 13 December 2013 10:27, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> > In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use the
>>> personal pronoun "you", it's the only other fellow in the room with me; but
>>> in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of the
>>> duplicating machine and a identical looking man standing to the left of the
>>> duplicating machine and they both have a equal right to use the grand title
>>> "you".
>>>
>>
>>
> > But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way,
>>
>
> No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines; and by insisting
> that they do you're assuming the most important part of the very thing
> you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know if he's the copy or the
> original. Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old or 40 seconds old. Mr.
> You does know that he's the guy who is having this thought right now, but
> in a worjd of duplicating machines that is insufficient information to make
> a differentiation because that fellow over there (or is it a mirror) could
> be having the exact same thought at the exact same time.
>

But I *do *know who I am in the first person, regardless of my personal
history, and regardless of the existence of duplicating machines. We could
make further extensions to the above scenario - say I'm really a digital
copy, stored in a computer in Daniel Dennett's secret laboratory, but
linked to the senses of an android which seems to be human - it appears
human when it looks at itself in the mirror, etc. As far as I can tell I am
that android, and unless it strays so far from my computer that there are
appreciable delays in communication, or its batteries run out or something,
I will never know otherwise. But even so, I am still correct about who I am.

I think you're mixing up my first person knowledge of who am I with the
third person knowledge required to know about the history of my body.

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