On 17 Dec 2013, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/17/2013 1:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Dec 2013, at 00:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/16/2013 2:05 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 10:43, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Is that another way of saying you don't think Arithmetical
Realism is correct? (Which is fair enough, of course, it is a
Yes. I think it is a questionable hypothesis.
Yes, I think so too on days with an 'R' in them.
Well if you don't think AR is correct, then of course it sounds
magical (although that leaves the problem of how those equations
which somehow (magically?) control the behaviour of atoms
actually do so.)
I don't think they 'control' them, I think they describe them (to
the best of our knowledge). Notice that this explains "where the
laws of physics come from"; they're invented by us.
Bad phraseology on my part. What I meant was, there is a possible
problem of "unreasonable effectiveness" that AR purports to
explain, but which otherwise remains "magical".
Obviously the laws of physics as written down and taught and
understood by us were invented by us, but we have this hope that
they correspond to something real out there, and it's at least
possible that the "something real out there" comes in a form
(something like) the laws we've invented to describe it, and may
be in a form exactly like some laws we will one day invent. On
that glorious day it may seem like splitting haris to say that
mass, energy, space and time are in some magical way different
from the equations describing them, assuming such equations exist.
True, the models might be accurate. But even if they are we can't
know it with any certainty.
Except our own consciousness here and now, we cannot have any
certainty, in any scientific matter.
Science is doubt, and leads to more doubt, always.
That's one thing that bothers me about Bruno's definition of
knowledge as "true belief". We may have true beliefs by accident.
But notice that the 'laws of physics' don't describe everything -
in general they rely on 'boundary conditions' which are not part
of the laws. Most theories of cosmogony put forward rely some
randomness, e.g. 'quantum fluctuations', as boundary conditions.
I don't believe in any 3p-randomness. I mean, no more than in Santa
Klaus. That's why I consider Everett to be the first sensical
version of QM.
Not believing can be just as dogmatic as belief. Everett doesn't
pretend to fix boundary conditions.
Indeed. There are none in his formulation. All solutions exists and
Secondly, note that even as physics becomes more successful in
predictive power and more comprehensive in scope, it's ontology
changes drastically, from rigid bodies to classical fields to
elementary particles to quantum field operators. What stays
roughly constant are the experimental facts.
Yes. A reason more to appreciate that with comp, the ontology can
be reduced to its minimal (0 and successor, of K and S and their
Bruno, has a good point about 'primitive matter'. It doesn't
really mean anything except 'the stuff our equations apply to.';
but since the equations are made up descriptions, the stuff they
apply to is part of the model - not necessarily the ding an
sich. To say physicist assume primitive matter is little more
than saying that they make models and some stuff is in the model
and some isn't - which of course is contrary to the usual
assumption on this list. :-)
Yes, some people on this list seem to read far more into the
existence of matter (energy, etc) than that it's just the object
referred to in some equations. (Arguments that the UD couldn't
really exist because there aren't enough resources in the
universe to build one, for example.)
Bruno et al may also have a good point about the (lack of)
supervenience of mind on matter, although I'm still trying to get
my head around that one (appropriately enough).
I don't think the supervenience of mind on material processes is
any more problematic than its supervenience on computation.
Supervenience of mind on material processes is refuted by the UDA.
I don't think it does.
You might elaborate.
It just doesn't make any sense anymore, unless you put in matter a
magic which is non Turing emulable, nor FPI recoverable, but then I
don't see how I could say "yes" to a doctor.
The nice thing about Bruno's theory is that it provides a model
which might explain the incommunicable nature of consciousness.
And he even provides a critereon, Lobianity, for whether a
computer is conscious.
Hmm... I accumulated evidence that consciousness starts with
universality. Löbianity would give self-consciousness, or reflexive
But it leaves so much of the physical aspects of consciousness and
This means you have not yet get the full understanding of UDA or
AUDA. The reasoning shows that all physical aspects are entirely
explained or explainable. Indeed if you can find one not explained
phenomenon in nature, you will refute comp.
Of course the explanation has been derived by a reasoning, and need
to be done (like in AUDA), and this means to pursue the math of
AUDA, and solve the open problem there.
I have no theory. I just show that the mind body problem *has to*
be reduced into a purely arithmetical problem of machine psychology
Exactly. Your theory *must* explain everything because it is
assumed to explain everything.
No, it explains everything because adding anything to it is
contradictory or necessarily redundant. That's what UDA shows.
You can add a God sitting on a cloud, if you believe in some of its
appearance, but comp explains then that such a God appearance must be
derived from the elementary axioms.
except by hand-waving "it must be so", that I find plenty of room
You can only invalidate the reasoning. No need of doubting here. Of
course you can doubt on comp.
Of course I doubt comp too. But I'm not sure the UDA proves what
you claim it does.
We can go back on any specific point. I have already acknowledge
understanding UDA 1-7, so I guess you are pointing on step 8.
ISTM that it requires anticipating all possible events in the MG in
order to have counterfactual completeness.
Each time you program a computer, you have to anticipate all possible
events. But to copy a brain, you can just hope that you get the
substitution level right, and rely on the local "nature's anticipation".
But that seems impossible. Second, you make the argument in terms
of a dream, obviously to isolate consciousness from the world. But
I'm not convinced that is valid.
We have already discuss this. Your remark would just asked for the
generalized brain, using some part of the environment.
Without experience of the world, would dreams be possible? In any
case it seems like a suspicious move.
If experience in a world is needed, then comp is false.
And if you allow interaction with the world then the MG program
grows into a simulation of the whole world (or a very large part of
it). You dismiss this by saying it just means the substitution
level includes everything out to Hubble sphere. But then you are no
longer talking about replacing a brain, you're talking about
creating a whole, simulated world - and in such detail that there's
no distinction between it being 'real' or 'simulated'.
The only point which is used is that whatever is the level, if it
exist, the UD will reach the relevant comp states infinitely often.
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