On 19 Dec 2013, at 18:08, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 4:42 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>>> It is clear that you don't take the first person experiences
into account"
>> "The" not "a" ?? For the third time please say how many first
person experiences exist on planet Earth right now
> Locally, 7 billions of humans first person experiences, + the
animals. Globally: an infinity (with either comp or Everett). But
the point is that each feel unique. The question is about such first
person experience, viewed from their first person points of view.
Yes that is indeed the question, and because it wasn't answered the
first 4 times it was asked John Clark will ask it yet again: How
many first person experiences viewed from their first person points
of view does Bruno Marchal believe exists on planet Earth right now?
The question is ambiguous.
In the 3p view, and the answer stays the same 7 billions (+
animals ...).
But in each of those 1p view the answer is 1. The personal diary will
mention only one first person experience.
>> and if there are more than one which one is Bruno Marchal
referring to?
> Locally, only one, although this is debatable.
There is only one so if "you" see Moscow "you" can conclude that
absolutely NOBODY observes Washington from their first person
experience viewed from their first person points of view.
I am in Helsinki when I am asked to evaluate the probability. So I see
neither W nor M.
> Now, you agree that there is an indeterminacy.
It's not the new sort of indeterminacy found in Quantum Mechanics
QM indeterminacy, with Everett, is a particular case of that new comp
indeterminacy.
nor the sort of indeterminacy found by Turing,
Exact.
it's the sort of indeterminacy caused by a simple lack of
information and first discovered by Og the caveman;
Do you think Og was aware of the possibility of self-duplication? They
could not see amoeba, and I doubt they knew much about machine
duplication.
if you knew what city you were going to see you'd know what man you
were going to turn into. You don't turn into the Moscow Man and then
see Moscow, you see Moscow and then turn into the Moscow Man.
No problem, the point is that such an indeterminacy has become a
simple theorem. That's the whole point, and it uses explicitly the
numerical identity (at the supposedly right computationalist
substitution level) obtained through self-duplication.
By itself, self-duplication is not so easy. Descartes searches for a
solution all its life. The computer science solution has been found by
Kleene (as I exploit in the purely math version of the UDA).
> So what about step 4?
Induction says that because the first 3 steps
You just said that you agree with it (even Og agrees with it). You
just contradict yourself.
Bruno
suck step 4 probably will suck too; and deduction says that because
step 4 is built upon the foundation of the previous 3 sucky steps
then step 4 must suck too.
John K Clark
You agreed that P("W v M") = 1. You agree that P(W) and P(M) are
different from 1, and that P(W) + P(M) = 1, and I guess you will
agree that P(M) = P(W) (if not, why?). So P(M) = P(W) = 1/2 is a
quite reasonable probability distribution in that step 3 protocol. OK?
So what about step 4? Would the introduction of a delay of
reconstitution in, say, Moscow, changes this P(M) = P(W) = 1/2 into
something else?
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
