On 19 Dec 2013, at 18:08, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 4:42 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>> It is clear that you don't take the first person experiences into account"

>> "The" not "a" ?? For the third time please say how many first person experiences exist on planet Earth right now

> Locally, 7 billions of humans first person experiences, + the animals. Globally: an infinity (with either comp or Everett). But the point is that each feel unique. The question is about such first person experience, viewed from their first person points of view.

Yes that is indeed the question, and because it wasn't answered the first 4 times it was asked John Clark will ask it yet again: How many first person experiences viewed from their first person points of view does Bruno Marchal believe exists on planet Earth right now?


The question is ambiguous.
In the 3p view, and the answer stays the same 7 billions (+ animals ...). But in each of those 1p view the answer is 1. The personal diary will mention only one first person experience.



>> and if there are more than one which one is Bruno Marchal referring to?

> Locally, only one, although this is debatable.

There is only one so if "you" see Moscow "you" can conclude that absolutely NOBODY observes Washington from their first person experience viewed from their first person points of view.

I am in Helsinki when I am asked to evaluate the probability. So I see neither W nor M.




> Now, you agree that there is an indeterminacy.

It's not the new sort of indeterminacy found in Quantum Mechanics

QM indeterminacy, with Everett, is a particular case of that new comp indeterminacy.




nor the sort of indeterminacy found by Turing,

Exact.



it's the sort of indeterminacy caused by a simple lack of information and first discovered by Og the caveman;

Do you think Og was aware of the possibility of self-duplication? They could not see amoeba, and I doubt they knew much about machine duplication.




if you knew what city you were going to see you'd know what man you were going to turn into. You don't turn into the Moscow Man and then see Moscow, you see Moscow and then turn into the Moscow Man.

No problem, the point is that such an indeterminacy has become a simple theorem. That's the whole point, and it uses explicitly the numerical identity (at the supposedly right computationalist substitution level) obtained through self-duplication. By itself, self-duplication is not so easy. Descartes searches for a solution all its life. The computer science solution has been found by Kleene (as I exploit in the purely math version of the UDA).



> So what about step 4?

Induction says that because the first 3 steps

You just said that you agree with it (even Og agrees with it). You just contradict yourself.

Bruno



suck step 4 probably will suck too; and deduction says that because step 4 is built upon the foundation of the previous 3 sucky steps then step 4 must suck too.

 John K Clark











You agreed that P("W v M") = 1. You agree that P(W) and P(M) are different from 1, and that P(W) + P(M) = 1, and I guess you will agree that P(M) = P(W) (if not, why?). So P(M) = P(W) = 1/2 is a quite reasonable probability distribution in that step 3 protocol. OK?

So what about step 4? Would the introduction of a delay of reconstitution in, say, Moscow, changes this P(M) = P(W) = 1/2 into something else?

Bruno






  John K Clark




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to