On 19 Dec 2013, at 22:26, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Dec 19, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>
wrote:
>1. Teleportation is survivable
Yes.
> 2.Teleportation with a time delay is survivable, and the time
delay is imperceptible to the person teleported
Obviously.
> 3. Duplication (teleportation to two locations: one intended and
one unintended) is survivable,
That's basically the same as #1.
Good.
> and following duplication there is a 50% chance of finding oneself
at the intended destination
JOHN CLARK HATES PRONOUNS! Following duplication there is a 100%
chance Jason Resch will be at the intended destination.
Yes, but the question is asked before the duplication. If you say 100%
for this city, the guy in the other city will understand that he was
mistaken, and by comp, his voices must be taken into account (he is as
much the Helsinki guy than his doppel in the other city).
> 4. Duplication with delay changes nothing.
Obviously.
With comp? yes.
But this contradict Robert Nozick's theory of personal identity,
showing that his theory violates computationalism.
> 5. Teleportation without destroying the original is equivalent to
the duplication with delay.
Which is equivalent to duplication without delay, which is
equivalent to duplication and destroying the original, which is
equivalent to duplication and destroying the copy.
Good.
> If someone creates a copy of you somewhere, there is a 50% chance
you will find yourself in that alternate location.
JOHN CLARK HATES PRONOUNS! If someone creates a copy of Jason Resch
somewhere, there is a 100% chance Jason Resch will find Jason Resch
to be in that alternate location.
After the duplication. Not before when the question is asked. You re-
do an old error you committed in earlier discussion.
The question is asked before the duplication, concerns the future
(unique) first person experience. You have agreed that P("the
experience will be felt as unique) = 1, as it is true for both copies.
> 6. If a virtual copy of you is instantiated in a computer
somewhere, then as in step 5, there is a 50% chance you will find
yourself trapped in that computer simulation.
JOHN CLARK HATES PRONOUNS! If a virtual copy of Jason Resch is
instantiated in a computer somewhere, then as in step 5, there is a
100% chance Jason Resch will find Jason Resch to be trapped in that
computer simulation.
After the duplication. You could say that if I throw a coin, after I
see in on "head", there is 100% chance that I will see it on head.
The question on the probability of an outcome makes sense only before
we do the experience.
> 7. A computer with enough time and memory, that iteratively
executes all programs in parallel will "kidnap" everyone, since all
observers everywhere (in all universes) will eventually find
themselves to be in this computer
Could be.
Not" could". It is the case that a universal dovetailing will go
through your actual state, necessarily, or comp is false.
> 8. There is no need to build the computer in step 7, since the
executions of all programs exist within the relations between large
numbers.
That would only be true if everything that could exist does exist,
and maybe that's the way things are but it is not obviously true.
You don't need "everything that could exist" exist. To prove that the
UD go through all you states, you need only logic + arithmetic (and
comp).
> Hence, arithmetical realism is a candidate TOE.
A candidate certainly, but is it the real deal? Maybe but it's not
obvious.
If it (or anything Turing equivalent) is not the real deal, you have
to justify what role play in anything you would add to the deal, and
you have to justify that it is neither turing emulable or FPI
recoverable. But the step 8 shows that you can no more say "yes" to
the doctor, in virtue of comp. You can still say "yes" to the doctor
by invoking some magic.
> This is the "grand conclusion" you have been missing for all these
years. I don't think this was obvious to Og the caveman.
Nor is it obvious to John the non-caveman.
Good.
In step 3, you confuse again the prediction made in Helsinki, and the
confirmation/refutation of the prediction, asked in both Moscow and
Washington.
Let me ask you the question in this way. I will do one of the
following different protocol.
1) I duplicate you like in step 3, but I chose the reconstitution
place with a good random coin.
2) I duplicate you like in step 3.
Do you think that you would be able to *feel* (first person) a
difference between the two protocoles?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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